Regulation,  Republican Moments,  and Energy Policy Reform by Spence, David B.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2011 | Issue 5 Article 5
12-1-2011
Regulation, "Republican Moments," and Energy
Policy Reform
David B. Spence
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, and the Energy Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
David B. Spence, Regulation, "Republican Moments," and Energy Policy Reform, 2011 BYU L. Rev. 1561 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2011/iss5/5
DO NOT DELETE 12/13/2011 4:54 PM 
 
1561 
Regulation, “Republican Moments,” and Energy 
Policy Reform 
David B. Spence 
During the last half decade or so, energy policy reform has made 
its way to the top of the American policymaking agenda, driven by a 
groundswell of concern over environmental issues (primarily climate 
change), energy security issues, and the desire for a more efficient 
and reliable energy delivery system. This groundswell has produced 
some recent policy changes, but they have not been enough to satisfy 
proponents of reform, who remain frustrated with the unwillingness 
of Congress to pass legislation aimed at fundamentally changing the 
way Americans produce and consume energy. This Article examines 
the reasons why fundamental energy policy reform has been so 
difficult.  
Part I explores the historical context to the current reform 
debate, beginning with the energy policy reforms enacted in the 
1970s. Part II examines more closely the current logic of reform, 
including the reasons why Congress is considering such fundamental 
energy policy change now, and the menu of policy instruments 
under consideration. Part III examines the political logic that 
governs legislative action and the contextual and issue-based reasons 
why the energy policy reforms under consideration are particularly 
difficult for Congress to enact compared with major regulatory 
reforms of the past. I argue here that Congress is capable of enacting 
regulatory reforms over the objections of well-organized interests 
(so-called “republican moments”), but Congress is particularly ill-
equipped (or disinclined) to do so when, as here: (i) the issues are 
technically and politically complex, making the benefits of reform (or 
costs of inaction) seem unclear and remote to many voters, and (ii) 
the costs of reform fall upon current voters while many of the 
benefits accrue to others. Part IV offers some brief concluding 
 
 .  Associate Professor of Law, Politics & Regulation, McCombs School of Business, 
University of Texas at Austin. The Author would like to thank Buzz Thompson, Michael 
Wara, and all the participants in the Stanford Environmental Law Seminar for their comments 
on an earlier draft of this Article, and Kelly Cavazos, Amanda Onwuka, and Brian Tomasovic 
for their research assistance during its preparation. 
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thoughts about the kinds of developments that might change the 
current political dynamic so as to make reform more likely. 
I. WHERE WE’VE BEEN: REFORM AND THE PATH TO (MORE) 
REFORM 
A. Regulatory Activity, 1970-2000 
It has been approximately three decades since Congress, the 
President, and regulators last sought to fundamentally change the 
way Americans produce and consume energy. In the 1970s 
policymakers were motivated by environmental and energy security 
concerns. Environmentalism was at its peak as a motivating force for 
legislation in the 1970s, producing the Clean Air Act of 1970,1 the 
Clean Water Act of 1972,2 and major hazardous waste legislation.3 
These new regulatory regimes imposed new pollution control costs 
on fossil fuels, requiring automobiles and industry alike to comply 
with new emissions standards. Meanwhile, the formation of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)4 and the 
resultant oil shocks of the 1970s heightened energy security 
concerns, as did the widespread perception that the United States 
was running out of natural gas.5 The result was a portfolio of 
 
 1. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 2. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 
U.S.C.). 
 3. The two major statutes are the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) 
(regulating the ongoing management of hazardous waste), and the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 
Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (regulating the cleanup of 
the inactive hazardous waste sites). 
 4. During the 1970s, OPEC boycotts and production restrictions caused price 
volatility in oil markets, gasoline shortages, and rationing in the United States, as well as an 
increase in the market price of oil from less than four dollars a barrel to more than thirty dollars 
a barrel in 1981. For a good explanation of these developments see DANIEL YERGIN, THE 
PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY, AND POWER 501–681 (1991). 
 5. In the early 1970s U.S. proven reserves of natural gas had fallen to a little over two 
hundred trillion cubic feet. At that time, American consumption was in the neighborhood of 
twenty trillion cubic feet a year, leading some analysts to state that the United States had only 
ten years’ worth of natural gas supply in reserve. See, e.g., Ed Edelson, Why We’re Running Out 
of Gasoline, POPULAR SCI., Apr. 1973, at 82, 83. Writing six months before the oil embargo 
Edelson observed, “If you haven’t noticed, we’re running out of natural gas. Reserves dropped 
by 7.1 percent in 1971, the fourth straight year in which the U.S. used more gas than was 
discovered.” Id. 
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legislation and regulatory initiatives that represented, collectively, an 
attempt to reduce the United States’ dependence on oil and steer the 
economy toward cleaner and more efficient energy alternatives.  
This legislative trend began in 1975 when Congress created 
national fuel economy standards for automobiles known as “CAFE 
standards.”6 That same year Congress established the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve, the culmination of an effort on the part of the 
Nixon and Ford administrations to build up a reserve supply of oil to 
be used during future supply interruptions.7 The Reserve stores oil in 
various places throughout the United States and retains the capacity 
to provide about a month’s worth of oil consumption.8 Beginning in 
1977, the Carter Administration made energy policy a priority, 
creating the new Department of Energy9 and securing the passage of 
a legislative package that addressed supply and shortage concerns in 
several ways. First, the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA)10 
deregulated the price of natural gas at the wellhead, ultimately 
stimulating both the discovery of new domestic sources of gas and 
greater efficiency in natural gas markets.11 The Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA)12 promoted conservation 
and “alternative” forms of electricity production by providing 
financial incentives to new, nonutility producers of renewable 
 
 6. These standards imposed average fuel economy requirements for cars, light trucks, 
and SUVs. Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). “CAFE” stands for “corporate 
average fuel economy.” 
 7. BRUCE A. BEAUBOUEF, THE STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE 15, 29 (2007). The 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve was also a part of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 
1975. Id. 
 8. The United States Department of Energy manages the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. 
For more information about the Reserve, see U.S. Dep’t of Energy, STRATEGIC PETROLEUM 
RES., http://www.spr.doe.gov (last visited Aug. 18, 2011). 
 9. Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 567 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7111–7112, 7131 (2006)). 
 10. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 11. Prior to the NGPA, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission had been 
attempting to regulate prices at the wellhead, having been ordered to do so by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in the 1950s. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 684–85 
(1954). For a good summary of the NGPA, its purpose and its consequences, see Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63, 87–88 
(1982). 
 12. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 16 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 
43 U.S.C.). 
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electricity and cogeneration.13 The Carter energy package included 
investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation for alternative 
energy projects,14 along with PURPA’s powerful mandate that 
electric utilities purchase power from alternative energy producers 
(so-called “qualifying facilities” or “QFs”) at favorable rates. 15 The 
Carter Administration’s last energy hurrah was the creation of the 
short-lived Synfuels Corporation in 1980, which provided federal 
seed money for research into synthetic fuels.16 While the corporation 
was abolished five years later, many of the ideas that germinated 
under its care have been put into practice since.17  
Following the Carter administration’s lead, state legislatures and 
regulators began to more actively promote conservation and cleaner 
energy. State public utility commissions, using their leverage over 
utility rates, began to mandate that utilities undertake investments in 
conservation18 and that utilities focus more on demand-side 
reductions in usage as another way of balancing supply and demand 
(along with the construction of new sources of electricity).19 In the 
 
 13. PURPA defined “alternative” energy facilities to include various forms of renewable 
energy like solar, wind, and geothermal, as well as small hydroelectric facilities and 
cogeneration plants. Cogeneration facilities produce electricity as well as usable heat energy, 
and most of the many hundreds of cogeneration facilities built after the passage of PURPA in 
the 1980s were gas-fired. 16 U.S.C § 824a–3 (2006). 
 14. The Carter tax credits expired during the Reagan administration. In 1992, Congress 
established a production tax credit for renewable energy projects in the Energy Policy Act of 
1992. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (codified in scattered 
sections of 15, 16, 38, and 42 U.S.C. (2006)). Congress has intermittently renewed short-
term investment and/or production tax credits for renewable energy ever since, and 
production credits still remain in effect. Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 
3174 (codified in scattered sections of 23 and 26 U.S.C.). 
 15. Under PURPA, electric utilities were required to purchase power from certain 
qualified facilities at “avoided cost,” the cost to the utilities of providing power from a new 
generating facility of their own. 16 U.S.C. § 824a–3 (2006). 
 16. The Synthetic Fuels Corporation was established as part of the Energy Security Act 
of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 
and 42 U.S.C.).  
 17. Janet Raloff, Washington Deals Synfuels a Big Blow, 128 SCI. NEWS 87, 87 (1985); 
U.S. Treasury Takes Over Existing Synfuels Contracts, 63 PLATT’S OILGRAM NEWS 4, 4 (1985) 
(reporting President Reagan’s signature of legislation abolishing the corporation). Ideas 
incubated at the Synfuels Corp. include specific processes for creating liquid transportation fuel 
from coal (so-called “coal to liquids” or “CTL” processes) and natural gas (“gas to liquids,” or 
“GTL” processes).  
 18. For a discussion of these state efforts, see FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, 
ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 967–84 (3d ed. 2010). 
 19. Some states went so far as to adopt something called “integrated resources 
planning,” under which utilities must undertake demand-side investments in conservation to 
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1980s and 90s states began establishing “renewable portfolio 
standards” (RPS), requiring electric utilities to buy a specified 
percentage (or, in some cases, amount) of electricity from renewable 
sources.20 State RPS vary widely: each defines “renewable energy” 
differently and establishes different targets, and range from 
Minnesota’s requirement that 25% of all electricity come from 
renewables by the year 2025,21 to Texas’s rather modest goals, which 
are established not in percentages of power sold but rather in 
megawatts of capacity.22  
Collectively, these policy developments stimulated a great degree 
of entrepreneurial activity in the energy sector. The NGPA paved the 
way for the introduction of competitive wholesale markets in the 
natural gas industry in the 1980s by stimulating the entry of new gas 
producers into the market. PURPA and the Energy Policy Act of 
199223 brought to the market new kinds of energy production by 
nonutility entrepreneurs—QFs and other so-called “independent 
power producers” or “IPPs.” These incentives also helped to bring 
down the cost of wind generation, which plummeted in the last 
three decades as wind-generated capacity in the United States 
increased rapidly.24 Hydroelectric generation also grew significantly 
during the 1980s and 90s.25 For its part, solar energy’s growth spurt 
 
meet future imbalances in supply and demand if those demand-side investments are less 
expensive than constructing new plants. Id. 
 20. These targets and definitions of qualified sources vary by state. For up-to-date 
information about state RPS, see N.C. Solar Ctr. & The Interstate Renewable Energy Council, 
DSIREUSA, http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited Aug. 18, 2011). 
 21. MINN. STAT. § 216B.1691 (2010). 
 22. Texas’s goals are modest for two reasons. First, each time the legislature has raised 
the target the market has already built nearly that much capacity. Second, the goals are 
essentially voluntary, and there are no significant financial consequences for retail energy 
providers who fail to meet them. See TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 39.904 (West 1999) (amended 
2005) (amendment replacing the renewable capacity targets every two years from 2003–2009, 
with new targets every two years from 2007–2015). 
 23. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 721, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2915 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824j) (provision for open access to transmission lines). 
 24. Troy Helming, Uncle Sam’s New Year’s Resolution, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD 
(Feb. 2, 2004), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2004/02/uncle-
sams-new-years-resolution-10420; see also ROBERT Y. REDLINGER ET AL., WIND ENERGY IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 73–96 (2002) (covering the economics of wind energy and depicting the 
increasing efficiencies and decreasing capital and other costs of wind in the 1980s and 90s).  
 25. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission experienced steady growth in 
hydroelectric license applications throughout the early 1980s, most of them small projects 
responding to federal incentives. For a summary of these developments, see David B. Spence, 
Agency Discretion and the Dynamics of Procedural Reform, 59 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 425, 425–72 
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was delayed until the early twenty-first century, when advances in the 
production of less expensive, more energy-efficient photovoltaic 
cells26 and concentrated solar technology finally took hold.27  
The rise of nonutility, merchant power producers helped create 
the conditions necessary for the move to competitive markets in the 
electricity industry in the 1990s. By the turn of the century, 
competition and market pricing had largely replaced traditional 
public utility regulation of gas and electric wholesale markets in the 
United States,28 and approximately twenty states had introduced 
retail competition and market pricing in the electric sector. However, 
during the California energy crisis of 2000–2001,29 wholesale market 
prices for electricity soared to many times historic levels, slowing the 
move toward retail competition in the states and keeping regulators 
concerned over both the vulnerability of consumers to high and 
volatile prices and the ability of the aging electric grid to withstand 
the rapid increases in third-party power transactions.30 The Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission and electric grid managers continue 
to experiment with ways to shift demand during peak periods to off-
peak periods, obviating the need to build expensive peaking plants. 
Many analysts believe that investment in a better, smarter, electric 
grid could help solve these problems by providing essential technical 
and price information to market participants and regulators alike.31  
 
(1999). 
 26. Utility scale capacity for solar thermal/PV increased 91 MW in 2007, a 22% national 
increase. New capacity in Nevada—including the 64 MW Nevada Solar One (solar thermal) 
and a 14 MW PV-plant at Nellis Air Force Base—accounted for 79 MW. See US Solar Installed 
Capacity Sees Fastest Growth in 2010, BRIGHTSTAR SOLAR, http:// 
www.brightstarsolar.net/2011/03/us-solar-installed-capacity-sees-fastest-growth-in-2010/ 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2011). 
 27. See, e.g., Cyrus Moulton, Introducing the Most Efficient Solar Power in the World, 30 
DISCOVER MAG. 17, 17 (2009), available at http://discovermagazine.com/2009/oct/08-
introducing-most-efficient-solar-power-in-world (describing how 38-foot-wide reflective dishes 
used Stirling engines to accomplish a 31.25% efficiency benchmark in converting solar thermal 
energy to electricity).  
 28. See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL 
L. REV. 765, 765–66 (2008). 
 29. Id. at 779–80.  
 30. Id. at 785–89. 
 31. Because electricity cannot be stored in large amounts, operators of the grid must 
continuously balance supply and demand. A “smarter” grid would provide grid operators with 
more information, including granular information, about daily and seasonal changes in demand 
and about use of the various segments of the grid. This information could be used to allow 
grid operators to balance loads more effectively, thereby preventing the kind of blackouts 
experienced in the Northeast and Midwest in 2003; it could also lead to new rate structures to 
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Meanwhile, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, changing 
environmental requirements put additional cost pressure on fossil 
fuels. Increasingly broad and stringent regulation of coal-fired power 
plants and oil refineries reduced emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen 
oxides, and particulate matter from those sources.32 More specifically, 
the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act created the so-called 
“acid rain program,” which imposed additional sulfur dioxide 
regulation on previously grandfathered coal-fired power plants33 
through the first national tradable permit program in the United 
States. Several decades of litigation has extended the Clean Air Act’s 
stricter emissions standards for other pollutants to those 
grandfathered plants.34 Meanwhile, the 1990 amendments also paved 
the way for the regulation of toxic mercury emissions from coal-fired 
power plants, though that process was also slowed considerably by 
litigation.35 In the transportation sector, biofuels began to make 
inroads into the transportation fuels market in the 1990s, spurred by 
federal incentives for the production of corn ethanol36 and Clean Air 
 
induce electricity consumers to change their consumption patterns, thereby reducing load 
peaks and eliminating the need for construction of some peaking plants. See, e.g., PETER FOX-
PENNER, SMART POWER: CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SMART GRID, AND THE FUTURE OF 
ELECTRIC UTILITIES (2010). 
 32. Not only have standards for air emissions from coal-fired power plants grown more 
stringent over time, a series of legislative and regulatory developments have extended their 
coverage to older, previously grandfathered coal-fired power plants and oil refineries. For a 
summary of these developments, see BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at ch. 4.  
 33. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C. ). 
 34. The Clean Air Act’s permitting standards apply to “new or modified” sources of air 
pollution. Id. Therefore, litigation focused on the question of whether plants that predated the 
Clean Air Act were nevertheless required to meet the Act’s standards because they had been 
“modified” (e.g., after parts were replaced or other upgrades were made). In 2007, the 
Supreme Court upheld an EPA interpretation of the word “modified” and effectively extended 
the Act’s permitting standards to many older plants. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 
U.S. 561, 562–64 (2007). 
 35. For a summary of the battle over mercury regulation, see New Jersey v. EPA, 517 
F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (overturning the Bush EPA’s mercury rules and recounting their 
history), cert. denied 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009). On February 6, 2009, the Obama EPA 
announced its intention to promulgate mercury rules under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 
including a Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standard for coal-fired power 
plants. Steven D. Cook, EPA Plans Mercury Rules for Power Plants, Moves to Withdraw 
Supreme Court Petition, 40 ENV’T REP. 317 (2009).  
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (2006). See 40 C.F.R. §§ 79.1–79.68 (2010) for the EPA’s 
regulations on gasoline additives. 
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Act requirements mandating the use of additives in gasoline to 
reduce tailpipe emissions.37  
B. Energy Policy Reform in the Twenty-First Century 
Despite all this policy change, in the early twenty-first century 
Americans continue to rely heavily on imported oil and dirty, coal-
fired power. Of the roughly eighty million barrels of oil38 consumed 
daily in the world, Americans consume about twenty million 
barrels.39 Net imports represent about three-fifths of those twenty 
million barrels.40 In the last decade, gasoline prices in the United 
States, though volatile, have remained low relative to elsewhere in 
the developed world,41 feeding American drivers’ addiction to oil. 
Some drivers have turned to ethanol, biodiesel, and electric and 
hybrid-electric cars, but the overwhelming majority of American cars 
continue to burn gasoline. Likewise, despite its growing regulatory 
burden, coal remains the dominant source of electric power in the 
United States, constituting about half of our total generating 
capacity.42 In percentage terms, renewable sources like wind are 
 
 37. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399.  
 38. One barrel equals forty-two gallons. General Tables of Units of Measurement, NAT’L 
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., http://ts.nist.gov/WeightsAndMeasures/Publications/ 
appxc.cfm (last updated Apr. 19, 2006). 
 39. The CIA assembles annual data on oil consumption. See World Factbook, Country 
Comparison: Oil – Consumption, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,  https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2174rank.html (last visited Sept. 23, 
2011). 
 40. Most American oil imports come from Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, and the Middle  
 East. See BP, BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY JUNE 2010, at 20 (2010). 
 41. Since 2000, gasoline prices in the United States have averaged between $1.50 and 
$3.50 a gallon. Because of differentials in delivery costs and state taxes, there has been 
considerable variation around those mean prices, but gasoline prices above $4.00 a gallon have 
been very rare in the United States. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, RETAIL 
GASOLINE HISTORICAL PRICES (2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/ 
data_publications/wrgp/mogas_history.html. By contrast, prices in excess of $8.00 a gallon 
are common in Europe, and have been over the last decade, primarily due to higher energy 
taxes in Europe. See Bruce Crumley, Think Gas is High, Try Europe, TIME WORLD (May 28, 
2008), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1809900,00.html.  
 42. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2009, 
at 9 (2011), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa.pdf. Across the 
individual American states there is great variety in their generation mixes. Some states rely on 
coal for as much as ninety percent of their generating capacity; others have little or no coal-
fired capacity. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY PRODUCTION 
ESTIMATES IN TRILLION BTU, at tbl.P2 (2009), available at http://205.254.135.24/state/ 
seds/sep_prod/pdf/P2.pdf.  
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growing faster than coal-fired generation; however, renewables 
started from a very small base. In 2009, renewables (hydro, wind, 
solar, and geothermal) constituted more than 10% of American 
electric generation, and two-thirds of that 10% was hydroelectric 
power.43 In fact, the lion’s share of growth in electric generating 
capacity since the 1970s has been taken by natural gas-fired plants,44 
which are relatively inexpensive to build, produce fewer pollutants 
per unit of energy produced than coal, and have benefited from 
advances in turbine design that have driven down costs. They do, 
however, emit many of the same pollutants emitted by coal and oil 
combustion.45 
Increasing dissatisfaction with this pollution was already 
provoking renewed calls for comprehensive and fundamental energy 
policy reform before two important catalyzing events transformed 
those calls into a much louder chorus: (1) the September 11th 
attacks (and ensuing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan), which triggered 
growing concern about the effects of dependence on foreign oil on 
energy security and American foreign policy; and (2) the consensus 
within the last decade among climatologists that man-made 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are contributing significantly to 
global warming,46 a notion that in turn fed public concern about 
climate change. The war in Iraq contributed to a worldwide 
reduction in the supply of oil (as Iraq’s production dropped from 
two million barrels per day to about 1.4 million barrels per day).47 
Since September 11th, Americans have become more acutely aware 
of their dependence upon oil imported from countries like Saudi 
Arabia, from which most of the September 11th hijackers came. 
 
 43. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 95, at 
tbl.7.2b (2011), available at http://205.254.135.24/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/ 
mer.pdf. 
 44. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRICITY NET 
GENERATION, at tbl.8.2a, available at http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/txt/ 
ptb0802a.html.  
 45.  Clean Energy, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ 
cleanenergy/energy-and-you/affect/air-emissions.html (last updated Dec. 28, 2007). 
 46. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT (2008), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf  
 47. See BP, PUTTING ENERGY IN THE SPOTLIGHT: BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD 
ENERGY 2005, at 6 (2005), available at http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/ 
globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/publications/energy_reviews_2005/STAGING/local_assets/
downloads/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2005.pdf.  
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Thus, September 11th highlighted a long-standing vulnerability, and 
in so doing, contributed to public support for greater energy 
independence.  
Likewise, scientific concern over the effects of anthropogenic 
emissions of greenhouse gases is not new. The leading scientific 
organization for the study of global warming and climate change, 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), was 
created more than two decades ago.48 However, within the last 
decade the consensus among world’s climatologists that human 
activities (primarily, emissions of greenhouse gases49 and 
deforestation) are significantly hastening global warming has grown 
stronger.50 Global mean temperatures are behaving consistently with 
the models produced by climatologists, and we are already 
witnessing many of the effects projected by these models, such as 
excessive heat, more intense droughts, more severe storms, and the 
rapid shrinking of polar ice caps.51 Greenhouse gas concentrations in 
 
 48. The IPCC acts as a clearinghouse, aggregator, and evaluator of climate change 
research. For more information about its origins and work, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch (last visited Sept. 27, 2011). 
 49. The primary greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and 
various fluorocarbon compounds. Molecules of these gases tend to trap more solar radiation in 
the atmosphere than other air molecules. Among greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide tends to 
garner the most attention because its volume in the atmosphere dwarfs that of other 
greenhouse gases, even though other gases, such as methane, trap more heat on a molecule-
by-molecule basis. 
 50. In the words of the IPCC, it is “very likely” that human activity is driving climate 
change. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 46. Climatologists 
have reached this consensus as a result of models that examine factors that influence climate (as 
opposed to weather), both natural and man-made. Using data about these potential 
determinants of climate change, along with historical climate data, climatologists have found 
that models that ascribe significant effects to human activities do the best job of predicting 
climate change. For an accessible discussion of the impact of greenhouse gas emissions on 
climate, see PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE CAUSES OF GLOBAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE: SCIENCE BRIEF 1 (2008).  
 51. See Justin Gillis, In Weather Chaos, a Case for Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
14 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/science/earth/15climate.html?ref= 
temperaturerising (quoting a representative of the National Climactic Data Center suggesting 
that these effects are consistent with climate change models); Leslie Kaufman, Scientists’ Report 
Stresses Urgency of Limiting Greenhouse Gas Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2001, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/science/earth/13climate.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq= 
leslie kaufman nation%27 scientific establishment issued a stark&st=cse (describing the 
National Research Council’s warning that the risks of inaction on climate change are 
profound); Bryan Walsh, Why an Antarctic Glacier Is Melting So Quickly, TIME (June 27, 
2011), http://ecocentric.blogs.time.com/2011/06/27/why-an-antarctic-glacier-is-melting-
so-quickly/ (summarizing scientific understanding of shrinking polar ice caps). 
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the atmosphere have increased from their preindustrial level of 280 
parts per million (ppm)52 to their current level of about 390 ppm.53 
Because greenhouse gases dissipate slowly in the atmosphere, today’s 
emissions will have warming effects for many years to come. Over 
the last decade, climatologists and some political leaders have 
concluded that managing growth in greenhouse gas emissions to 
stabilize concentrations at a level of 450 ppm or lower should 
minimize the probability of catastrophic effects.54  
The catastrophic effects of global warming and the likelihood 
that humans contribute to the harm have fed public desire for 
cleaner, more secure sources of energy and kept energy policy reform 
on the public agenda over the last decade. The latter years of the 
George W. Bush administration produced at least three major energy 
bills,55 and the Obama administration pledged that fundamental 
energy policy reform would be one of its top policy priorities.56  
II. THE LOGIC OF REFORM 
A. Objectives and Constraints 
We can discern three sets of objectives driving the current wave 
of energy policy reform in Congress and the executive branch, as 
suggested by Table 1 below. These include (i) environmental 
concerns, including the desire to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, 
(ii) security concerns, including the desire to reduce dependence 
upon imported oil, and (iii) efficiency and reliability concerns, 
including the desire to use energy efficiently or to maintain a reliable 
 
 52. This number represents a concentration of carbon dioxide or amounts of other 
greenhouse gases with equivalent heat trapping capabilities to carbon dioxide. 
 53. CO2Now.org tracks atmospheric concentrations of CO2. See generally 
CO2NOW.ORG, http://www.CO2now.org (last visited Sept. 27, 2011).  
 54. The 450 ppm number represents an estimate of the maximum atmospheric 
concentration that is necessary to keep global mean temperature increases at 2°C or lower. 
However, there is considerable disagreement among climatologists and others over the 
desirable maximum concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Some analysts argue 
that the 450 ppm figure is too high because climate change is taking place considerably faster 
than scientists had predicted only a short time ago. See, e.g., FRANK ACKERMAN ET AL., THE 
ECONOMICS OF 350: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF CLIMATE STABILIZATION 9 (2009); 
NICHOLAS STERN, THE STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, at vii 
(2006).  
 55.  See infra Part II.B.1.b. 
 56.  See Obama’s Key Promises, WASH. POST, http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/special/politics/obamas-promises/ (last updated Jan. 20, 2010).  
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energy delivery system. Table 1 also suggests that the primary 
constraint preventing legislative action toward these goals is concern 
over the costs of action. Can we or should we bear the costs of 
reform, such as higher energy prices and higher prices for energy-
intensive products? Will the benefits exceed the costs? Can we afford 
it? Collectively, these questions have been the focus of a great deal of 
policy and scholarly attention over the last decade or more. That 
attention has produced a great deal of information and analysis 
aimed at measuring the costs and benefits of pursuing the objectives 
listed on the left side of Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Objectives and Constraints of Energy Policy Reform 
 
Objectives Constraints 
Environmental concerns; e.g.:  
 Slow growth in GHG emissions to 
reach maximum 450 ppm goal  
 Mitigate and adapt to the effects 
of climate change  
 Reduce emissions of pollutants 
(other than CO2) from fossil fuel 
combustion 
Concern over direct costs (of 
energy to businesses and 
consumers); e.g.:  
 gasoline prices 
 electricity prices 
 taxes (if reform is revenue-
neutral to the federal budget) 
Security concerns; e.g.:  
 Reduce dependence on oil 
 Reduce leverage of producing 
nations over U.S. policy 
 Address security issues associated 
with climate change 
Concern over indirect costs; e.g.:  
 increased price of goods due to 
costlier energy and other 
resource inputs 
 net job losses and other 
consequential effects 
 
Efficiency and reliability 
concerns; e.g.:  
 Reduce consumption of energy 
and use energy more efficiently  
 Improve reliability and operation 
of electric grid  
 Reduce price volatility associated 
with supply/demand imbalances 
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1. Environmental concerns 
Among environmental concerns, the lion’s share of attention has 
been devoted to the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions on the 
climate. Less attention has been devoted to the other environmental 
impacts associated with the use of fossil fuels. Issues like the impacts 
of surface coal mining (e.g., on water quality), gasoline-powered 
vehicles (e.g., on smog levels), and mercury emissions from coal-
fired power plants (e.g., on the safety of the food chain) remain 
important, but have received far less attention recently, perhaps 
because they are familiar, their impacts are more localized, and 
regulatory instruments already address those issues. Not so with 
greenhouse gas emissions. Assessing the costs and benefits of taking 
action to address climate change is an extraordinarily complicated 
task, one to which geoscientists and economists have devoted an 
enormous amount of attention. That literature is far too large to 
summarize fully here, but it is possible to identify some of its key 
conclusions and ideological fault lines.  
Economists and geoscientists employ a variety of models, 
including so-called “integrated assessment models” (IAMs), to 
measure the costs and benefits of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
These models try to determine the optimal emissions path for 
society, taking into consideration a wide variety of characteristics 
about the natural carbon cycle, the impacts of human activity on that 
cycle, predictions about how natural and human systems will respond 
to climate change, and more.57 These models also attempt to 
estimate a wide variety of impacts from increasing global 
temperatures, including damage to markets (such as changing crop 
yields) and property (such as the inundation of land), direct and 
indirect costs associated with the reduced availability of fresh water 
(such as health effects and relocation costs), damage from more 
extreme weather events or sea level rise (such as flooding), lost 
ecosystem services, and lost biodiversity. Some of these costs are far 
easier to quantify than others. In order to do so, researchers must 
sometimes make assumptions about how (and how successfully) 
humans and ecosystems will adapt to change. Likewise, estimating 
the cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions requires assumptions 
 
 57. For a description of integrated assessment models, see MICHAEL D. MASTRANDREA, 
CALCULATING THE BENEFITS OF CLIMATE POLICY (2009) and LAWRENCE H. GOULDER & 
WILLIAM A. PIZER, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 4–13 (2006). 
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about how the public and private sectors will pursue this goal. Will 
governments mandate emissions reductions? If so, how? Will the 
U.S. government impose a tradable permitting system? Will it 
impose environmental taxes? There are also questions about how 
modelers should discount the future, given that greenhouse gases 
remain in the atmosphere for a very long time, and the benefits of 
reducing emissions will accrue mostly to future generations while the 
current generation will bear the costs.  
Different models answer these questions differently, employing 
different assumptions and discount rates. Naturally, these different 
models have led to varying estimates of the net benefits of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. Certainly, the worst case scenarios are 
bleak, but there is disagreement over the probability of encountering 
the worst case scenario. One 2005 meta-analysis, by Richard Tol, 
looked at twenty-eight climate-change IAM studies and attempted to 
summarize conclusions they reached. Tol discovered a very large 
range of estimates (from negative prices to prices in the hundreds of 
dollars per ton of carbon) and concluded that point estimates of 
prices were highly sensitive to discount rates and other assumptions. 
His “best guess” estimate was only $5 per ton of carbon.58 We can 
chalk up some of this variation to the difficulty of predicting how the 
climate system will react to temperature increases and how (and how 
effectively) humans will react and adapt to physical changes in the 
environment. On the other hand, there is much more certainty 
about (and much smaller confidence intervals around estimates of) 
the costs of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. For example, we are 
developing better data about the cost of capturing carbon and 
storing it, though this technology remains in its infancy.59 We also 
now have much more experience with lower-polluting combined 
cycle natural gas plants and renewable energy, and we are learning 
more about the costs of electric cars and hybrid cars.  
Despite the uncertainty, most economic studies of climate 
change conclude that the benefits of reducing emissions exceed the 
costs. A more recent meta-analysis commissioned by the British 
 
 58. Richard S.J. Tol, The Marginal Damage Costs of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: An 
Assessment of the Uncertainties, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 2064, 2072–73 (2005), available at 
http://www.fnu.zmaw.de/fileadmin/fnu-files/publication/tol/enpolmargcost.pdf. 
 59. For an accessible discussion of the cost of carbon capture and storage, see Int’l 
Energy Agency, CO2 Capture and Storage, 2006 IEA ENERGY TECH. ESSENTIALS 1, 2, 
available at http://www.iea.org/techno/essentials1.pdf. 
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government, the so-called “Stern Review,” reaches this conclusion 
and argues that recent experience with temperature change implies 
that the costs of warming will be far greater than earlier models 
anticipated. The Stern Review concludes that: 
 The world will be unlikely to stabilize greenhouse gas 
concentrations at the equivalent of 450 ppm of CO; rather, a 
concentration in the neighborhood of 500 to 550 ppm is more 
likely.  
 Stabilizing emissions at the 550 ppm level will cost 
approximately one percent of GDP, but it will avoid costs that 
are likely to be five to ten times greater than that.60 
Tol disputes the Stern Review’s conclusions on a number of 
grounds, the most basic being his contention that the Stern Review 
underestimates the degree to which developing economies will grow 
and be better able to tackle problems that might otherwise be 
associated with climate change.61 On the other hand, in May of 
2011, the National Research Council issued a report confirming the 
validity of climate science and endorsing strong regulatory action on 
climate change, concluding that the risks of inaction far outweigh 
the risks of action.62 
Scholars seem to agree that the impacts of climate change will be 
very unevenly distributed, with more costs falling on the developing 
nations of the tropics.63 However, many scholars still disagree about 
(a) the ability of developing countries to adapt to climate change, 
with or without the help of richer countries, and (b) the degree to 
which wealthier countries can reduce emissions in sufficient 
quantities to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at acceptable 
levels. The first issue reflects a widely acknowledged problem with 
some of the IAM analyses of climate change; namely, their failure to 
account adequately for the effects of human adaptation to climate 
change as it occurs. For example, Tol’s critique of the Stern Review 
includes the charge that it takes “a rather dim view of human 
ingenuity,” and that it underestimates the ability of African countries 
 
 60. STERN, supra note 54, at xii fig.3. 
 61. RICHARD S.J. TOL, THE STERN REVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE: A COMMENT 2–3 (2006) [hereinafter TOL, THE STERN REVIEW].  
 62. The NRC is an arm of the National Academy of Sciences. See COMM. ON 
AMERICA’S CLIMATE CHOICES, AMERICA’S CLIMATE CHOICES (2011), available at 
http://americasclimatechoices.org/. 
 63. Id.; STERN, supra note 54, at xxi. 
DO NOT DELETE 12/13/2011 4:54 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1576 
and their wealthier world sponsors to mitigate or avoid many of the 
harshest costs associated with climate change.64 Tol is less sanguine 
about human ingenuity as applied to the problem of pollution 
control, however, arguing that the Stern Review relies upon models 
that make “overly optimistic assumptions [about] technological 
progress and the costs of emission abatement.”65 For its part, the 
Stern Review argues that adaptation is more difficult in developing 
countries, where poverty and poor governance hinder collective 
action.66  
Some analyses suggest that wealthy countries in temperate 
climates might even benefit overall from climate change, or at least 
that the costs to those countries of reducing emissions far exceed the 
benefits (avoided costs). Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein suggest that 
it would be more efficient for wealthy countries to make direct 
transfer payments to countries who bear the brunt of climate change 
costs than for those wealthier countries to try to reduce their 
emissions.67 Others dispute these claims.68 However, these claims 
raise a particularly difficult aspect of combating climate change: the 
requirement of worldwide collective action. As developing countries, 
China and India were not obligated to reduce their emissions under 
the Kyoto Protocol; now they are two of the largest emitters of 
greenhouse gases.69 Some fear that in the absence of emissions 
reductions in China and India, the benefits of greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions may never be realized.70 Thus, while the weight 
of scholarly opinion points toward the need for action to reduce 
 
 64. TOL, THE STERN REVIEW, supra note 61, at 2. 
 65. Id. at 3. 
 66. STERN, supra note 54, at xxi. 
 67. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice (John M. Olin Law 
and Econ., Working Paper No. 354, 2007).  
 68. Jody Freeman and Andrew Guzmán argue that the United States will not benefit 
from climate change and that many analysts underestimate the impacts of climate change on 
the United States. Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzmán, Seawalls Are Not Enough: Climate 
Change and U.S. Interests (Univ. of Cal. Berkeley, Public Law Research Paper No. 1357690, 
2009). 
 69.  INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, CO2 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION 10 (2010), 
available at http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/CO2highlights.pdf (stating that the largest 
five CO2 emitters are China, the United States, the Russian Federation, India, and Japan). 
 70. Since Kyoto, negotiations over next steps in combating climate change have broken 
down repeatedly over the question of whether developing nations like China and India ought 
to commit to emissions reductions. They have steadfastly refused to do so, which was a sticking 
point at the most recent negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009. See John M. Broder, 
Many Goals Remain Unmet in Five Nations Climate Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, at A1.  
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greenhouse gas emissions, that action will require a worldwide 
collective effort. 
Looking more broadly at the environmental costs of coal-fired 
power beyond those associated with climate change, we can ascribe 
significant costs and risks to the inhalation of fine particles and the 
effects of toxic emissions from coal as well. A 2011 Harvard study 
concluded that Americans’ reliance on coal for energy is responsible 
for more than 10,000 premature deaths per year, as well as other 
health problems.71 It concluded that those costs, if reflected in the 
price of electricity, would more than double electricity costs on 
average.72 The growing body of evidence of harm associated with our 
reliance on coal may explain the Obama administration’s increasing 
attention to emissions from coal-fired power plants.  
2. Security concerns 
Americans’ discomfort with dependence upon foreign sources of 
oil dates back at least to the oil shocks of the 1970s. That discomfort 
was multiplied by the events of September 11, 2001. Climate change 
has added another foreign-policy concern, one tied to our reliance 
on fossil fuels generally, not simply those we import from elsewhere.  
Quantifying these security and foreign-policy costs to the United 
States is at least as difficult as quantifying the social net benefits of 
climate change. How do we value the myriad ways in which 
dependence on foreign sources of oil affects our foreign-policy 
decisions? Certainly the costs of dependence upon foreign sources of 
oil are felt acutely by most Americans when the world price of oil 
goes up, something Americans have experienced since the oil shocks 
of the 1970s.73 In 1973, when OPEC reacted to American support 
of Israel in the Yom Kippur war by imposing an oil embargo on the 
 
 71. See Paul R. Epstein et al., Full Cost Accounting for the Life Cycle of Coal, 1219 
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 73, 85 (2011). 
 72. Id. at 74. For a summary of other studies estimating the external costs of coal, see 
External Costs of Coal, SOURCEWATCH.ORG, http://tinyurl.com/42jtbdy (last visited Sept. 
28, 2011).  
 73. YERGIN, supra note 4, at chs. 29, 33 (detailing the American reaction to the oil 
crises of 1973 and 1979). On the other hand, price volatility has been a feature of oil markets 
since their inception, even in the early years when most American oil was domestically 
produced. During the middle and latter part of the 20th century, inexpensive oil from the 
Middle East displaced domestic production, much of it from Texas, leading to reduced 
production in Texas oil fields. See id. at 92–95, 499–500; see also BRYAN BURROUGH, THE BIG 
RICH: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREATEST TEXAS OIL FORTUNES 74–78, 152–54 (2009). 
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United States, the extent of American dependence upon foreign 
sources of oil became clear. While the energy reforms of the late 
1970s were designed in part to reduce that dependence, acceptance 
of an integrated world market for oil became a staple of American 
policy in the 1980s and 90s.74  
Dependence upon foreign oil has shaped American defense 
policy and has been a part of defense planning for many decades. 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) is the largest single 
purchaser of oil worldwide,75 consuming several hundred thousand 
barrels of oil per day.76 Several recent DoD studies have indicated 
that the American military does not see supply interruptions or 
shortages as a near-term risk, but it has focused more of its attention 
recently on developing alternative fuels, reasoning that doing so 
made good long-term strategic sense.77 However, dependence upon 
foreign oil affects American security in more important ways; namely, 
by influencing foreign-policy decisions, including decisions that lead 
to war. For this reason more than any other, the September 11 
attacks made integrated world oil markets seem even less acceptable 
to many Americans and brought renewed calls for greater energy 
independence.78  
Increased domestic production may lessen the pain associated 
with another oil embargo in the future, and the desire for greater oil 
independence seems to be behind the Obama administration’s 
decision to support offshore drilling, a decision that was reversed (at 
least for the near term) in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon 
 
 74. See YERGIN, supra note 4, at chs. 32–36. 
 75. “Leap Ahead” Technologies and Transformation Initiatives within Defense Science and 
Technology Program: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the 
Comm. on Armed Services, 107th Cong. 4–5 (2001) (statement of Hon. Edward C. Aldridge 
Jr., Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and statement of 
Dr. Dolores M. Etter, Acting Director, Defense Research and Engineering; Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Science and Technology).  
 76.  Sohbet Karbuz, How Much Energy Does the U.S. Military Consume, DAILY ENERGY 
REP., http://tinyurl.com/2g9zzfy (last visited Sept. 24, 2011). 
 77. See Steve Vogel, Pentagon Prioritizes Pursuit of Alternative Fuel Sources, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 13, 2009, at A13.  
 78. See PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, ERODING RESPECT FOR 
AMERICA NOW SEEN AS A MAJOR PROBLEM: FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES NOW DRIVEN BY 
9/11 AND IRAQ 19 (2004) (poll finding seven-in-ten Americans say ensuring adequate energy 
supplies should be a top priority and stating the issue has gained “somewhat greater 
importance since the mid-1990s, when roughly six-in-ten said this should be a top priority”). 
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oil spill.79 However, the Council on Foreign Relations disputes the 
notion that domestic production can produce energy independence. 
It concluded in 2006 that the American defense policy establishment 
needs to let go of the idea that the United States can achieve energy 
independence through increased production or stockpiles of oil.80 
Rather, as the Council suggested, it seems likely that true energy 
independence will require changes in the way we fuel our 
transportation fleet.81  
Moreover, the impacts of global warming can affect American 
foreign policy and security. In developing countries, higher 
temperatures may exacerbate water shortages and crop failures, 
producing dislocation and other conditions rife for armed conflict. A 
group of economists from Stanford, the University of California at 
Berkeley, New York University, and Harvard University attempted to 
estimate the increased number of war-related deaths in Africa that 
would be attributable to global climate change.82 Finding a strong 
historical correlation between warfare and temperature increases in 
Africa, they conclude that global warming will increase armed 
conflict in Africa (a continent from which the United States imports 
significant quantities of oil) by fifty-four percent, leading to nearly 
400,000 additional warfare related deaths by 2030.83 In 2004, a 
Pentagon analysis anticipated catastrophic resource shortages and an 
increased probability of warfare and other forms of conflict as a result 
of global warming.84 Another report by the CNA Corporation found 
that “projected climate change poses a serious threat to America’s 
national security,” and that it has the “potential to create sustained 
natural and humanitarian disasters on a scale far beyond those we see 
 
 79.  In announcing his rationale for the decision, President Obama said, “There will be . 
. . those who say we should not open any new areas to drilling. But . . . this announcement is 
part of a broader strategy that will move us from an economy that runs on fossil fuels and 
foreign oil to one that relies more on homegrown fuels and clean energy.” President Barack 
Obama, White House, Remarks on Energy Security at Andrews Air Force Base (Mar. 31, 
2010), available at http://tinyurl.com/yfwdytc. 
 80. See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT NO. 
58, NATIONAL SECURITY CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. OIL DEPENDENCY 35 (2006). 
 81. See id. at 37–38. 
 82.  Marshall B. Burke et al., Warming Increases the Risk of Civil War in Africa, 106 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 20,670 (2009). 
 83. Id. at 20,672. 
 84. This classified report was leaked to a British newspaper, The Observer. Mark 
Townsend & Paul Harris, Now the Pentagon Tells Bush: Climate Change Will Destroy Us, THE 
OBSERVER, Feb. 22, 2004, at 3.  
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today . . . .”85 The report predicts that the changes wrought by 
global warming will produce conditions that are rife for extremism, 
conflict, authoritarianism, and radical ideologies.86 It recommends 
that the United States take a “stronger national and international 
role to help stabilize climate change at levels that will avoid 
significant disruption of global security and stability.”87  
None of these analyses place a dollar value on the national 
security threats associated with dependency on foreign oil or climate 
change. We can infer, however, that conclusions like those reached 
by the CNA Corporation reflect an implicit conclusion that the 
benefits associated with combating climate change exceed the costs. 
B. Conservation and Efficiency 
The logic of conservation and efficiency is simple. It is not oil or 
gas or electricity that we really want: rather, it is the services that 
they provide. If we can obtain those same services while using less 
oil, gas, or electricity, we can (i) save money, (ii) reduce the 
environmental impacts associated with exploiting those energy 
sources, and (iii) reduce our dependence upon foreign energy 
sources. Because we can save money by using energy more 
efficiently, many of the gains associated with maximizing energy 
efficiency are already being realized. According to the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, the energy intensity of the American 
economy (measured in year 2000 dollars) declined from $17.34 per 
BTU in 1949 to $7.28 per BTU in 2009.88 Businesses, in particular, 
have better exploited energy efficiency opportunities since the energy 
crises of the 1970s.89  
But there remain additional unrealized opportunities as well. The 
American economy generates more output per capita than other 
economies, but per capita energy consumption in the United States 
remains very high—nearly double that of the average Western 
 
 85. THE CNA CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
44–45 (2007).  
 86.  Id. at 44. 
 87. Id. at 7. 
 88. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2009 
(2010), available at http://205.254.135.24/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf.  
 89. See Energy Innovation, Efficiency Can Help Small Businesses Prosper, 
BUSINESSNEWSDAILY, Sept. 23, 2011, http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/national-energy-
regulation-small-business-support-1814/.  
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European.90 Some analysts believe that energy efficiency holds great 
promise in the effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Princeton 
professors Robert Socolow and Stephen Pacala suggest an approach 
to stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations that focuses on so-
called “stabilization wedges.”91 These wedges represent individual 
steps (of roughly equal effect on carbon emissions) that society can 
take to reduce growth in the rate of greenhouse gas emissions, such 
as improving the efficiency of household energy consumption, 
implementing changes in the transportation sector’s energy usage, 
and increasing reliance on renewable energy.92 Nearly half of the 
possible reductions Socolow and Pacala identify can be realized 
through various forms of conservation or efficiency. Many of these 
wedges are also among the more cost-effective approaches to 
combating climate change.  
A recent study by the consulting firm McKinsey and Co. echoed 
the conclusions of Socolow and Pacala. McKinsey predicted that 
energy efficiency investments could yield a 23% reduction in energy 
demand in the United States and benefits that more than double the 
costs.93 The problem, argued McKinsey, is that the various energy-
 
 90. In 2006, United States per capita consumption of primary energy was 334.6 million 
Btu, compared to 146.2 million Btu per capita in Europe. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T 
OF ENERGY, WORLD PER CAPITA TOTAL PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION, 1980–2006 
(2008), available at  http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/energyconsumption.html 
(open the Excel document for “Most Countries” under “Per Capita (Per Person) Total 
Primary Energy Consumption (Million Btu per Person).”) In 2007, estimates for electricity 
consumption as “kWh/capita” show that U.S. individual demand (13616 kWh) greatly 
exceeds demand in Germany (7185 kWh), Spain (6296 kWh), and the United Kingdom (6142 
kWh). INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS 48–57 (2009), available at 
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2009/key_stats_2009.pdf. 
 91. Robert Socolow & Stephen Pacala, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate 
Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCI. 968 (2004).  
 92. Id. at 969–71. For a detailed description of the various energy efficiency law and 
policy improvements that might comprise these various wedges, see John Dernbach, 
Stabilizing and Then Reducing U.S. Energy Consumption: Legal and Policy Tools for Efficiency 
and Conservation, 37 ENVTL. L. REV. 10,003 (2007). 
 93. HANNAH CHOI GRANADE ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., UNLOCKING ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY IN THE US ECONOMY, at iv (2009), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/ 
Client_Service/Electric_Power_and_Natural_Gas/Latest_thinking/~/media/McKinsey/dotc
om/client_service/EPNG/PDFs/Unlocking%20energy%20efficiency/US_energy_efficiency_f
ull_report.ashx. See also David Hodas, Imagining the Unimaginable: Reducing U.S. Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions by Forty Percent, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 271 (2008) (making the case for larger 
productions); Michael Vandenbergh et al., Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 715 (2011) (detailing the literature on behavioral impediments to energy efficiency 
investments). 
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saving opportunities in the U.S. economy are fragmented, spread 
across “more than 100 million locations and billions of devices,” 
making coordinated solutions difficult.94 Thus, part of the problem is 
that many of the remaining unrealized energy efficiency 
opportunities can be realized only by individuals, not businesses. 
They are attached to individual consumers’ decisions, such as 
purchasing relatively energy-inefficient homes, cars, and appliances, 
for example. Economist Stephen DeCanio calls this tendency of 
consumers to miss opportunities to save money through energy 
efficiency “the energy efficiency paradox.”95  
Some scholars ascribe these unrealized opportunities to 
behavioral heuristics that prevent people from recognizing the 
opportunities posed by efficiency investments, and they suggest that 
the problem is one of “norm activation.”96 John Dernbach argues 
that people pass up opportunities to save energy and money because 
the issue of energy efficiency is not sufficiently salient to them.97 Part 
of the salience of the problem is the “out of sight, out of mind” 
problem: if people are made more aware of the energy they are using 
to perform tasks, they will improve their energy efficiency.  
The other part of the salience issue is the effect of social norms: 
generally speaking, people wish to conform to social norms and 
expectations. They lack information about the energy they are using, 
about opportunities to save money by using less energy, and 
(perhaps most importantly) about how much energy their peers are 
using.98 Dernbach argues that governments and private standard-
setting organizations can activate norms of energy efficiency by 
ensuring that consumers understand national and local energy 
efficiency goals and have access to information about their (and their 
peers’) energy usage.99  
 
 94. GRANADE ET AL., supra note 93, at viii. 
 95. Stephen J. DeCanio, The Efficiency Paradox: Bureaucratic and Organizational 
Barriers to Profitable Energy-Saving Investments, 26 ENERGY POL’Y 441, 441 (1998). 
 96. See, e.g., Hunt Allcott & Sendhil Mullainathan, Behavior and Energy Policy, 327 SCI. 
1204 (2010) (summarizing some of the literature on new norms and energy consumption, and 
suggesting ways to activate norms of conservation and efficiency investment); John C. 
Dernbach, Overcoming the Behavioral Impetus for Greater US Energy Consumption, 20 PAC. 
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 15 (2007); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. 
Steinemann, The Carbon-Neutral Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673 (2007).  
 97. Dernbach, supra note 92, at 10,028–31. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. 
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1. Translating objectives into policies 
a. Policy instruments. There is no shortage of reasons to pursue 
fundamental energy policy reform. However, in its barest form, the 
logic of reform ignores distributional issues. That is, energy policy 
reform may yield positive net benefits to the world, but the world is 
not a unitary actor. Real action will be taken by a combination of 
government and private sector actors, both individual and collective. 
In China, if the government wishes to shift from coal-fired power to 
hydroelectric or nuclear power, it can do so by making a unilateral 
decision to build more hydroelectric plants and fewer coal-fired 
plants, because, in China, the energy sector is mostly in government 
hands. The U.S. government cannot simply throttle up or throttle 
down greenhouse gas emissions, oil imports, or efficiency in 
consumption. Rather, because most investment in energy production 
and distribution is undertaken by the private sector, the U.S. 
government must rely on law and regulation to steer private 
investment in favored directions. It must use policy mandates or 
incentives to influence private sector action.  
Consequently, for government the true choice variables in the 
pursuit of energy policy reform are the regulatory instruments it 
employs to induce changes in production and consumption patterns. 
Table 2, below, organizes the relevant regulatory instruments into 
their essential categories. We can think of the energy sector as 
divided along two dimensions: the first distinguishes production 
from consumption, and the second distinguishes the transportation 
sector from the stationary (home or business) energy-use sector. For 
example, we can focus on producers of greenhouse gas emissions, 
like vehicles and stationary sources. We can tax their emissions, or 
impose a so-called “cap and trade” or “tradable permit” system that 
would auction or distribute progressively fewer marketable permits 
(rights to emit GHGs) to emitters over time. Or we can focus on 
consumers of energy by (i) mandating that they either purchase less 
energy (by way of mandatory efficiency standards for vehicles, 
appliances, and buildings) or energy from less polluting sources (as 
would a national RPS for electricity), (ii) subsidizing their purchases 
of clean fuels and technologies, and/or (iii) requiring investment in 
smart grid technology so as to enhance electric grid reliability.  
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Table 2: Selected Regulatory Instruments (Choice Variables) for Energy Policy 
Reform 






standards for vehicles. 
Likely alternative vehicle 
technologies:  
 Ethanol (corn; 
cellulosic) 
 Biodiesel 
 Electric vehicles 
(EVs), hybrid 
electrics, and plug-in 
hybrid electrics 
(PHEVs) 
 Natural gas 
 
Carbon (Gasoline) Tax 
 
Subsidies for 
manufacture of preferred 
technologies (production 
of alternatively fueled 
vehicles, mass transit, etc.) 








(municipal solid waste, 
landfill gas, etc.) 
 Other 
 
Subsidies for preferred 
technologies (e.g., renewables, 
nuclear power, etc.) 
 
Mandatory smart grid 
investments by utilities 
 Grid improvements 
 Smart meters 
 Demand response tariffs 
 
GHG emissions reduction: 
 GHG standards under the 
CAA (including carbon 
capture and sequestration) 
 Marketable permit 
system (cap and trade) 






(rebates, tax credits or 
deductions) for alternative 
fueled-vehicles (biofuels, 
EVs, PHEVs, hybrids) 
 
More stringent CAFE 
standards (fuel efficiency) 
 
 
Mandatory smart grid 





Appliance efficiency standards 
 
Subsidies for purchase of 
efficient buildings and appliances, 
distributed (renewable) 
generation, etc.
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b. Recent steps toward reform. Within the last few years, regulators 
and legislators have begun to experiment with some of the 
regulatory instruments listed in Table 2. In 2005, the Bush 
administration issued more stringent CAFE standards for SUVs and 
light trucks.100 However, environmental groups challenged these 
standards as insufficiently stringent, and they were overturned by the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 2007.101 Between 2005 and 2008, 
Congress passed (and the President signed) three energy bills. On 
each of these occasions, proponents of greenhouse gas emissions 
regulation and strong federal action to mandate increased use of 
renewables came away disappointed. However, these three statutes—
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005),102 the Energy 
Information and Security Act of 2007 (EISA),103 and the Energy 
Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 (EIEA),104 along with the 
inclusion of some energy provisions in the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA),105 did establish some important 
incentives for movement away from fossil fuels and toward more 
secure, cleaner technologies and fuels.  
What did these federal laws do? For the most part, they created 
new or extended financial incentives such as loan guarantees and tax 
credits for (i) the production and consumption of renewable and 
other domestic sources of energy, (ii) greater efficiency in 
consumption, and (iii) investments in energy security and reliability. 
The EPAct 2005 focused on energy security over environmental 
objectives, creating powerful new financial incentives to jumpstart 
the moribund American nuclear power industry106 and allocating 
 
 100. Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks, Model Years 2008-2011, 71 
Fed. Reg. 17,566 (Apr. 6, 2006) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 533, 537). 
 101. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508 
(9th Cir. 2007), vacated and withdrawn, 538 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 102. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in 
scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 103. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 
1492 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 15, 29, 42, 46, and 49 U.S.C.). 
 104. Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 
3808 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).  
 105. American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
116 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 106. Most importantly, the statute extended insurance guarantees contained in the Price 
Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act through 2025 and added additional loan 
guarantees, a production tax credit, and additional financial protections for cost overruns and 
delays. Energy Policy Act of 2005 tit. VI. Some of these provisions apply only to the first six 
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large sums of money in the form of tax benefits for domestic fossil 
fuel production as well as renewables and efficiency.107 On the other 
hand, the statute did mandate increases in the use of ethanol as a 
gasoline additive to 7.5 billion gallons by 2012.108 This mandate was 
strengthened two years later with the passage of EISA, which 
established a target of 36 billion gallons by 2022.109 This statute, 
along with EIEA, focused more directly on efficiency and 
renewables, strengthening and extending some of the financial 
incentives found in EPAct 2005,110 repealing some existing subsidies 
for oil and gas development,111 and imposing new efficiency 
standards for appliances.112 The 2009 stimulus bill, ARRA, added 
money to the pot for efficiency,113 alternative fuels,114 and 
infrastructure development.115 
Perhaps the two most important products of this barrage of 
legislation were (i) the long-term extension of the production tax 
credit for renewables116 and (ii) strengthened CAFE standards for 
automobiles. Since their inception in the late 1970s, tax credits for 
 
new nuclear power plants licensed and built after passage of the statute. Id. § 638(b). 
 107. SENATE COMM. ON ENV’T & NATURAL RES., IMPACTS OF THE ENERGY POLICY 
ACT OF 2005, available at http://tinyurl.com/3qlctwk. 
 108. Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1501. As an additive to gasoline for standard engines, 
ethanol comprises ten percent of the fuel mix, a mix that would be denoted “E-10.” This 
provision of the EPAct 2005 did not apply to higher mixes of ethanol, id., such as E-85, which 
cannot be burned in standard engines, and requires special or modified engines. In some parts 
of the country, such as the upper Midwest, use of E-85 is not uncommon. 
 109. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 202, 121 
Stat. 1492, 1521 (codified in 42 U.S.C. 7545(o)(2)). 
 110. Id. § 231 (extending and increasing EPAct 2005 funds for “bioenergy” research). 
 111. Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1502 (amending I.R.C. § 167(h)(5) to prolong the 
amortization of geological and geophysical expenditures for certain major integrated oil 
companies); An Act of Oct. 3, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, Division B—Energy Improvement 
and  Extension Act of 2008. §§ 401–402, 122 Stat. 3807, 3851–54 (amending revenue 
provisions for oil and gas industry on domestic production deduction and foreign tax credit). 
 112. Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 §§ 301–308 (efficiency standards 
for appliances and lighting). 
 113. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, Division A–
Appropriations Provision, tit. IV, 123 Stat. 116, 467–96 (appropriating an additional $16.8 
billion for ‘‘Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy” to the Department of Energy). 
 114. Id. § 1123 (amending I.R.C. § 30C to create a temporary credit for “alternative fuel 
vehicle refueling property”). 
 115. Id. at div. A, tit. XII (appropriating an additional $27.5 billion for “Highway 
Infrastructure Investment” to the Federal Highway Administration). 
 116.  Id. § 1101 (extending the “Credit for Electricity Produced from Certain Renewable 
Sources” at I.R.C. § 45). 
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renewable electricity-generating facilities were renewed by Congress 
sporadically, one or two years at a time.117 Because some renewable 
technologies depend on the credit to remain cost competitive, the 
inability to depend on that subsidy (about two cents per kilowatt 
hour for the production tax credit)118 made it difficult for sponsors of 
wind, solar, and other renewable facilities to plan and invest. After 
extending the production credit briefly under EIEA,119 Congress 
extended the credit to 2014 for certain renewable technologies and 
to 2011 for wind and solar in ARRA.120 As for CAFE standards, 
EISA raised standards for automobiles from the current 27.5 mpg 
for cars and 20.7 for SUVs and light trucks to 35 mpg for the entire 
fleet by 2020, a significant increase.121  
However, as during the early years of the environmental 
movement in the 1960s, these early steps toward energy policy 
reform by the federal government have been cautious and measured, 
and it was left to states to experiment with bolder action. Proponents 
of strong action called for limits on emissions of carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gases (which have not traditionally been regulated 
under the Clean Air Act) from automobiles and stationary sources, a 
national RPS for electricity, and standards mandating more efficient 
consumption, including appliance standards, changes to building 
codes, and even more stringent CAFE standards. Many such 
proposals were introduced in Congress during the first Bush 
administration;122 however, because they lacked the support of both 
 
 117. See supra note 14.  
 118. I.R.S. Form 8835, Renewable Electricity, Refined Coal, and Indian Coal 
Production Credit (OMB No. 1545-1362) (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f8835.pdf.  
 119. An Act of Oct. 3, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, Division B—Energy Improvement 
and Extension Act of 2008 § 101(a)(1), 122 Stat. 3807, 3808 (extending, inter alia, the 
I.R.C. § 45 credit for wind facilities through January 1, 2010). 
 120. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 1101 (extending the “Credit for 
Electricity Produced from Certain Renewable Resources” at I.R.C. § 45). 
 121. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, § 102(b)(2), 
121 Stat. 1492, 1499 (codified in 49 U.S.C. § 32902 (2006)).  
 122. Bills proposing carbon dioxide regulation during the Bush Administration include 
the Clean Power Act of 2002, S. 556, 107th Cong. (2002); The Clean Power Plant and 
Modernization Act of 2001, S. 1131, 107th Cong. (2001); The Clean Air Planning Act of 
2002, S. 3135, 107th Cong. (2002); Clean Smokestacks Act of 2003, H.R. 2042, 108th 
Cong. (2003); and Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2005, S. 1151, 109th Cong. 
(2005). See also H.R. 5756, 107th Cong. (2002) (seeking to establish a national RPS); 
Automobile Fuel Economy Act of 2001, S. 804, 107th Cong. (2001);. These are just a sample 
of a much larger set of at least twenty-five bills addressing these issues. Several of those bills 
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the President and the Republican majority, none of those bills were 
enacted into law. 
By comparison, state regulators have taken a much more direct 
approach to the problem of global warming and climate change in 
the last five years. For example, in 2006, California enacted AB 32, a 
law establishing a statewide program of greenhouse gas emission 
regulation that aims to reduce emissions in the state to 1990 levels 
by the year 2020.123 Using its unique power to establish independent 
automotive standards under the Clean Air Act,124 in 2005 the State 
of California sought EPA permission to regulate carbon dioxide 
emissions from vehicles.125 That same year, a group of Northeastern 
states formed the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), a 
cooperative effort to regulate greenhouse gases within their borders 
using a marketable permit system,126 not unlike the one already in 
place in the European Union.127 Under the RGGI program, most 
marketable permits (called “emissions allowances”) are auctioned off 
to emitters, and the proceeds are invested in energy efficiency, 
renewable energy, and other clean energy technologies. This marks a 
 
had bipartisan support, including one sponsored by 2008 Republican presidential nominee, 
John McCain. See Climate Stewardship Act of 2005, H.R. 759, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 123. This law has proven controversial, surviving a recall petition and a judicial challenge 
brought by environmental justice advocates challenging the cap-and-trade portions of the bill. 
See Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. CPF-09-5059562 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 
18, 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/51242057/AIR-v-CARB. 
 124. California is the only state authorized to establish its own standards for automobiles. 
The other forty-nine states may choose to apply either the federal standards or the California 
standards.  
 125. California’s petition to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from cars was rejected by 
the (Bush) EPA on the grounds that carbon dioxide is not a “pollutant” under the Clean Air 
Act. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court determined that EPA does have the power to 
regulate carbon dioxide as a pollutant under the Clean Air Act. 549 U.S. 497 (2006). In July 
of 2009, the (Obama) EPA reversed its position and granted California permission to regulate 
carbon dioxide emissions from cars. Notice of Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act 
Preemption, 74 Fed. Reg. 32, 744 (July 8, 2009). 
 126. Under RGGI, participating states are seeking a ten percent reduction in carbon 
dioxide emissions from within their borders by 2019. Memorandum from the New England 
Power Generators Association, Inc. to the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Working Group 
1 (Nov. 15, 2007), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/nepga.pdf. 
 127. For more on the European Union’s carbon trading scheme, see A. Danny Ellerman 
& Barbara K. Buchner, The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, 
and Early Results, REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y, Winter 2007, at 66, available at 
http://reep.oxfordjournals.org/content/1/1/66.full.pdf+html.  
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contrast with the acid rain program, in which most pollution rights 
are distributed to emitters free of charge based on past emissions.128 
However, state regulation is not a substitute for coordinated 
federal efforts; recent initiatives seem only to tinker around the edges 
of energy policy. The modest nature of these recent policy changes is 
reflected in the United States Energy Information Administration’s 
(EIA) 2010 projections for the United States’ energy future. While 
the EIA projects rapid growth in renewables, it also foresees 
continued dominance of fossil fuels through 2035. Fossil fuel 
consumption as a percentage of total consumption of energy liquids 
will decline from 84% to 78% (due to increased use of biofuels in 
transportation), and the total amount of liquid fossil fuels Americans 
consume will remain relatively steady.129 This means that Americans 
will continue to rely heavily on imported oil, with all of the foreign-
policy complications that reliance entails. Likewise, the EIA projects 
an increase in the use of coal-fired electricity generation in the next 
twenty-five years.130 If these projections hold true, the United States 
will continue to emit more greenhouse gases per capita than most 
other countries, making the possibility of achieving stable 
greenhouse gas concentrations at or below the 450 ppm level very 
remote.131  
Most of the regulatory instruments listed in Table 2 are coercive 
in nature, designed to force, rather than encourage, change. 
Mandatory greenhouse gas emissions limits for automobiles and 
stationary sources, for example, would force fundamental change in 
the production of automobiles and the way we generate electricity in 
the United States. More stringent CAFE standards would force 
manufacturers to produce, and consumers to buy, smaller, lighter 
vehicles. A national renewable portfolio standard for electricity 
generation would force electric utilities to acquire renewable 
electricity (or renewable energy credits representing the generation 
of renewable electricity), rather than merely encourage its 
 
 128. The European Union’s carbon trading scheme also distributes its pollution rights 
free of charge, for the most part. Id. at 73. 
 129. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 
2010: EARLY RELEASE OVERVIEW 6 (2009), available at http://www.eia.gov/ 
oiaf/aeo/pdf/overview.pdf. 
 130. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0383 ANNUAL 
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010, at 79 (2010), available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/ 
documents/DWP_--_Annual_Energy_Outlook_2010_%28with_ projections_to_2035%29.pdf.  
 131. STERN, supra note 54, at 201. 
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production. Whereas Bush administration energy legislation offered 
more carrots than sticks,132 the national elections of 2008 brought 
calls for stronger federal action aimed at curbing greenhouse gas 
emissions and promoting efficiency and renewables.  
Reflecting this preference for stronger regulation, the Obama 
administration (the “Administration”) has initiated the process of 
regulating carbon dioxide emissions from automobiles and stationary 
sources under the Clean Air Act133 and is further strengthening rules 
governing emissions of conventional and toxic pollutants from coal-
fired power plants.134 In July 2011, the Administration announced a 
plan to drastically tighten CAFE standards further to 54.5 miles a 
gallon between 2017 and 2025.135 Once these more efficient 
automobiles have fully penetrated the market, these new CAFE 
standards will reduce American oil consumption by more than ten 
 
 132. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.b. 
 133. The Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), paved 
the way for regulation of carbon dioxide under the Clean Air Act, though several interest 
groups have indicated that they are likely to challenge the EPA’s efforts in court. The EPA has 
acknowledged that regulation of greenhouse gas emissions through new legislation is 
preferable to administrative action but is pressing forward with its plans to regulate. See 
Limitation of Approval of Prevention of Significant Deterioration Provisions Concerning 
Greenhouse Gas Emitting-Sources in State Implementation Plans, 75 Fed. Reg. 82,536 (Dec. 
30, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (establishing rules for permitting GHG 
emissions for major new sources); Action to Ensure Authority to Issue Permits Under the 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program to Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: 
Finding of Failure to Submit State Implementation Plan Revisions Required for Greenhouse 
Gases, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,874 (Dec. 29, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (establishing 
EPA process for reviewing GHG emissions impacts in permit renewals); see also John M. 
Broder, E.P.A. Expected to Regulate Carbon Dioxide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, at A15, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/19/science/earth/19epa.html? 
pagewanted=all. 
 134. The EPA’s “Cross-State Air Pollution Rule,” finalized in the summer of 2011, 
targets emissions of ozone precursors and fine particulates from power plants. Federal 
Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and 
Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, and 97). A few months before, the EPA had proposed new rules governing 
the emissions of mercury and other toxic pollutants from fossil-fueled power plants. See 
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal and Oil-Fired Electric 
Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric 
Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional 
Steam Generating Units, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,976 (May 3, 2011). 
 135. Sharon Terlep, High Test: 54.5 MPG Cars Promise to Arrive by 2025, WALL ST. J., 
July 28, 2011, at B.1. An earlier 2009 plan had sought more modest goals. The White House 
Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Announces National Fuel Efficiency Policy, THE 
WHITE HOUSE (May 19, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/president-
obama-announces-national-fuel-efficiency-policy/. 
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percent (2.2 million barrels per day).136 Indeed, the Union of 
Concerned Scientists believes these standards could reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by more than 10%.137 In 2009, the 
Administration proposed limits on greenhouse gas emissions from 
stationary sources as well,138 and the Department of Energy has 
continued to seek improved appliance efficiency standards.139  
Energy bills introduced by the Democratic majority during the 
111th Congress represented by far the most comprehensive and 
fundamental attempt at regulatory reform in quite some time. In the 
summer of 2009, the House of Representatives passed House Bill 
2454, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, also 
known as the “Waxman–Markey” bill.140 Among other things, the 
bill 
 established a national RPS effective in 2012 (with an 
ultimate goal of requiring utilities to secure 20% of their 
electricity from renewable sources by the year 2020),141 
 required the EPA Administrator to promulgate 
regulations creating a marketable permit system for GHG 
emissions effective in 2012 (with an ultimate goal of 
reducing emissions to 17% of 2005 levels by the year 
2050),142 
 required a 65% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions 
from electric generating units by 2020,143 
 authorized the EPA Administrator to establish GHG 
emissions standards for new heavy-duty vehicles,144 and 
 
 136. Driving Efficiency: Cutting Costs for Families at the Pump and Slashing Dependence 
on Oil, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://tinyurl.com/3opytg3 (last visited Oct. 22, 2011). 
 137. That is, by about 190 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, as against 
annual emissions of just over one billion metric tons. Press Release, Union of Concerned 
Scientists, House Energy Bill Analysis (Dec. 5, 2007), available at http:// 
www.commondreams.org/news2007/1205-23.htm. 
 138. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
74 Fed. Reg. 57,126 (Nov. 4, 2009). 
 139. Press release, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Secretary Chu Announces More Stringent 
Standards for Home Water Heaters and Other Heating Products (Apr. 1, 2010), available at 
http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/news/news_detail.cfm/news_id=17429. 
 140. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). The named sponsors are Congressman Henry 
Waxman of California and Congressman Ed Markey of Massachusetts. 
 141. Id. § 101(d)(1)–(2). 
 142. Id. § 311. 
 143. Id. § 116. 
 144. Id. § 821. 
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 authorized the Secretary of Energy to establish national 
building code energy efficiency targets and to oversee a 
program of peak demand reduction for electric utilities.145 
For its part, the Senate took no final action on energy legislation in 
the 111th Congress. The bill that garnered the most attention was 
Senate Bill 1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, 
also known as the “Kerry-Boxer” bill.146 Kerry-Boxer was never 
reported out of committee in the Senate, and the Waxman-Markey 
bill (which passed narrowly in the House) was pronounced dead on 
arrival in the Senate by various commentators.147 During the spring 
of 2010, a bipartisan group of three senators—known as the “Gang 
of Three”—worked to reconfigure the bill so as to increase its 
chances of Senate passage.148 However, even that resuscitation effort 
seemed to fail when Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid announced 
in August 2010 that he had abandoned efforts to pass a 
comprehensive bill in the Senate.149 Comprehensive energy 
legislation has not been pursued in any serious way by the 112th 
Congress, perhaps reflecting majority opposition in the Republican-
controlled House of Representatives. 
III. THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF ENERGY POLICY REFORM 
If the benefits of energy policy reform exceed the costs, as many 
seem to believe, why has fundamental reform eluded the 
government’s grasp so far? Have voters failed to recognize the 
 
 145. Id. § 201. 
 146. S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009). The named sponsors are Senator John Kerry of 
Massachusetts and Senator Barbara Boxer of California. Kerry-Boxer would impose many of 
the same new requirements as Waxman-Markey, with a few differences. For example, it did not 
contain a national RPS. 
 147. Harry Fuller, Repubs Say the Waxman-Markey Bill Is DOA in Senate, GreenTech 
Pastures, ZDNET (June 28, 2009, 4:32 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/green/repubs-
say-the-waxman-markey-bill-is-doa-in-senate/5667. 
 148. Those senators were Republican Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, Independent 
Joe Lieberman of Connecticut, and Democrat John Kerry of Massachusetts. Joe Walsh, Kerry 
and Graham Renew Bipartisan Energy on Climate Bill, RED GREEN AND BLUE (Jan. 26, 
2010), http://tinyurl.com/yb2br85.  
 149. On August 2, 2010, Reid abandoned an effort to pass a watered-down bill that 
would have addressed energy efficiency and various issues associated with the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster, but which omitted provisions curbing greenhouse gas emissions or 
establishing a national RPS. David M. Herzehorn, Energy Bill a No Go in the Senate, The 
Caucus, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2010, 7:39 PM, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2010/08/03/energy-bill-a-no-go-in-the-senate/?partner=rss&emc=rss. 
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benefits of reform? Has Congress failed to translate voter preferences 
into policy decisions? Has it instead responded to powerful business 
interests at the expense of the public?  
A. The Logic of Legislative Action 
Political science literature offers some insight into these 
questions. Like legal scholarship, political science has been affected 
profoundly by the debate between economists’ rational actor model 
of human behavior and competing models arising out of behavioral 
and evolutionary psychology. Both perspectives have something to 
say about the politics of energy reform, and together they suggest an 
explanation for Congress’s inability to enact comprehensive energy 
policy reform to date. 
It is commonplace in rational actor analyses of congressional 
behavior to begin with two generally accepted premises. The first is 
that members of Congress are motivated by a mixture of goals, but 
the desire to be reelected is preeminent among them.150 Thus, 
legislators may seek particular policy goals, prestige, career 
advancement within the institution, etc.; however, in order to 
accomplish any of these goals, a legislator must remain in office.151 
The second premise is that voters are rationally ignorant; that is, they 
remain relatively uninformed about most policy decisions.152 It is 
rational for voters to be relatively less informed about policy choices 
because they lack the time, resources, and (sometimes) inclination to 
become fully informed. Therefore, they delegate the process of 
making informed decisions to their elected representatives. If 
legislators act as good Burkean trustees,153 the legislature ought to 
 
 150. This is the working assumption of most Congressional scholars in political science. 
See generally DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (2d ed. 2004) 
(often credited as the best argument for this working assumption).  
 151. RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 137 
(1978). 
 152. Economist Anthony Downs popularized this notion. See generally ANTHONY 
DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).  
 153. The British philosopher Edmund Burke is credited with first articulating this model 
of representation: namely, the elected representative as trustee making decisions on behalf of 
constituents, rather than acting on their specific instructions. Edmund Burke, Speech at the 
Conclusion of the Poll 3 November 1774, in 3 THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND 
BURKE 63, 68–70 (W. M. Elofson with John A. Woods eds., 1996). 
DO NOT DELETE 12/13/2011 4:54 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1594 
produce decisions that reflect the wishes of the fully informed 
median voter.154  
From these two propositions we can deduce some important 
conclusions about how individual legislators make policy choices. 
The first conclusion is obvious: if a legislator’s first goal is reelection, 
then calculations of the electoral risk associated with different courses 
of action will drive the initial stages of the legislator’s decision 
making process. Political scientists distinguish between the 
legislator’s “geographical constituency” and her “reelection 
constituency,”155 and it is the latter to which the legislator must 
attend to preserve her job.156  
At the same time, rational ignorance complicates the legislator’s 
choice. Legislators know that voters do not care about all issues 
equally. Therefore, for each policy choice a legislator faces, including 
questions of energy policy reform, she must try to anticipate the 
electoral risk of her action alternatives.157 That calculation, in turn, 
will depend upon several factors: 
  
 The electoral vulnerability of the legislator (the safety of 
the legislator’s seat and the reservoir of trust, or 
“leeway,”158 the legislator has developed among her 
reelection constituency). 
 
 154. That is, if we assume that preferences over policy alternatives can be represented as 
points distributed along a single dimension (i.e., points on a line), some voters (and legislators) 
will have preferences, represented by points in either tail of the distribution, while others will 
have preferences represented by points near the center or middle of the distribution. One 
voter’s preference will be represented by the median point in the distribution. We call this 
person the median voter. To suggest that the legislative choice should reflect the preferences of 
the fully informed median voter is to propose an economic description of the Burkean concept 
of representation. See FENNO, supra note 151. 
 155. FENNO, supra note 151, at 8; see also, GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS OF 
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 63–64 (7th ed. 2009) (describing the central task of 
congressional candidates: namely, to decide which parts of a heterogeneous constituency to 
write off, which to court, and how to reach the latter group). 
 156. This is because constituents will base their voting decisions in part on their 
retrospective evaluations of candidates’ performance in office. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE 
LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1990); WILLIAM T. BIANCO, TRUST: REPRESENTATIVES 
AND CONSTITUENTS (1994); MORRIS P. FIORINA, RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN 
NATIONAL ELECTIONS (1981). 
 157. Arnold notes that a vote can rouse the “attentive public,” a risk to which legislators 
must constantly attend. ARNOLD, supra note 156, at 64–68. 
 158. If the legislator enjoys the support of a very large majority of her constituents, she 
may have “leeway” to vote against their interests or preferences. That reserve of leeway can 
dwindle if she does so too often. BIANCO, supra note 156, at 79–80. 
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 The legislator’s perception of how salient the issue is to 
voters—i.e., how much voters know about the issue, and 
how likely it is that voters will become aware of the 
legislator’s choice.159  
 
 The legislator’s perception of voters’ preference intensity—
i.e., the importance of the issue to voters relative to other 
issues on which the legislator has taken a position. 
  
 The traceability of the consequences of the vote, both 
negative (the risk of blame) and positive (the ability to 
claim credit),160 which in turn is partly a function of the 
issue’s salience and other factors.  
 
Thus, if the legislator faces no electoral risk of any kind—
because her seat is safe, and/or few if any constituents care about the 
issue now or are likely to care later—the legislator is free to vote as 
she wishes without electoral consequence. At the other extreme, 
when electoral risk is high—because the issue is highly salient or 
important to all voters, and the legislator’s seat is not safe—the 
legislator’s choice should reflect the preferences of the median voter 
in her constituency.161 For example, Figure 1 depicts two possible 
distributions of constituent preferences: one approximates a normal 
distribution, and the other is bimodal.162 In both of these two 
hypothetical examples, the median voter’s (MV) position is the same; 
 
 159. The term “salient” is sometimes used in ways that conflate the notions of voter 
awareness and preference intensity, as in the sentence “Abortion policy is highly salient to 
right-to-life organizations.” I will use the term to refer to the level of current or likely future 
voter awareness of an issue or policy choice. I use the term “preference intensity” to refer to 
the issue of how much voters care about the issue. 
 160. See ARNOLD, supra note 156, at 47; FENNO, supra note 151, at 141–46. 
 161. In the linear model of voter position discussed earlier, supra note 154, and 
represented in Figure 1, we are assuming that each individual voter and each politician has a 
utility distribution that is at its highest point at the voter’s/politician’s ideal policy choice (her 
ideal point), and that individual utility over other choices falls as the distance between the 
individual’s ideal point in the policy choice grows. In the parlance of spatial modeling, we 
assume that individual preferences here are “single peaked”; collective preferences need not be 
single-peaked in order for the collective (in this case, say, a legislature) to make a rational 
choice. See supra text accompanying notes 153–154; infra  Figure 1.  
 162. This figure depicts the distribution of voters corresponding to preferences at each 
point on the line. Thus, collective preferences need not be single-peaked. In this depiction, we 
inferred that the legislator chooses the median voter’s ideal point in order to maximize her 
chances of reelection. 
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we might assume in this simple example that the legislator (L) 





However, in between these two extremes lies the far more 
interesting and common situation in which the legislator faces some 
electoral risk because the issue is salient and important to some 
voters but not others, and/or because some voters might become 
unhappy with the legislator’s choice later (“traceability”). In these 
situations, legislators might pursue their electoral goals by choosing 
policies that serve the interests of an attentive minority for whom the 
issue is particularly salient or important, at the expense of the 
remaining constituents’ (and the median constituent’s) 
preferences.163 Figure 2 depicts situations like this. In Figure 2, the 
shaded portions of the diagram represent voters to whom the policy 
issue at stake is more salient or more important; we might call these 
voters “high demanders” on this issue. Presumably, these high 
demanders are more likely to base their votes for or against the 
legislator at the next election on how the legislator votes on this 
policy issue in Congress. In that situation, it is rational for the 
legislator to move to a position that lies somewhere within the 
shaded portion of the diagram. 
 
 163. ARNOLD, supra note 156, at 82–87. 
Figure 1: Two Potential Distributions of Voter Opinion in a 
Hypothetical Legislative District
MV 
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Social scientists have long argued that the wealthy and business 
groups benefit from this phenomenon, exerting disproportionate 
influence over the policy process. Speaking long ago about the role 
of interest group pressure in the policy process, political scientist 
E.E. Schattschneider said, “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that 
the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent. Probably 
about 90 per cent of the people cannot get into the pressure 
system.”164 Economist Mancur Olson offered a logical explanation 
for this perception, arguing that small, organized groups face fewer 
transaction costs when organizing and have more to gain from 
organizing to pressure government;165 hence, they will have an easier 
 
 164. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 35 (1960). 
 165. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 141–46 (Schocken Books 1968) (1965). Olson’s work gave birth to 
a huge literature that conceptualized interest group activity and the regulatory process as a 
prisoner’s dilemma game, one in which members of groups representing diffuse interests have 







Figure 2: Legislator’s Choice When Salience and/or 
Preference Intensity Differs Among Voters
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time being heard by government officials.166 When legislators attend 
to the interests of these highly motivated, better informed 
minorities, Congress can produce decisions that deviate from 
majority opinion or from the fully informed preferences of the 
median voter.  
Figure 3 depicts one way in which the presence of high 
demanders can alter legislative choice. Assume in this legislature that 
there are seven members: four belong to the Left Party, and three to 
the Right Party. Imagine that each legislator’s position on the policy 
continuum represents the position of the median voter in his or her 
district. That is, we might imagine seven distributions of voter 
preferences—one for each legislator’s district—surrounding each 
legislator’s position on the policy continuum. In panels (a) and (b) 
of Figure 3, the distribution of preferences for legislator L4’s 
constituents are shown. Assuming relatively weak parties,167 if the 
issue is equally salient and important to all constituents, L4 will be 
the median voter in this legislature, and her position should prevail. 
This is the situation depicted in panel (a). However, if L4’s 
constituency includes high demanders, as depicted in panel (b), 
those high demanders move L4, making R1 the new median voter 
within the legislature.  
 
interests, further exacerbating the underrepresentation of nonbusiness interests. Two good 
post-Olsonian examinations of Olson’s ideas are RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 
(1982) and TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1992). 
 166.  OLSON, supra note 165, at 33–34. 
 167. In this context the term “weak parties” means that the party in the legislature exerts 
no voting discipline over its members. If parties were strong enough to determine and enforce 
a party position on an issue, the majority party (the Left Party, in this example) might select a 
favorite party position at, say, L3, and all four members of the left party might vote for that 
policy. The assumption of weak parties, as used here, eliminates that possibility and 
hypothesizes that legislators will vote in accordance with the preferences of their median 
constituent in the absence of high demanders. 
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 In this way, organized interests can exert outsized influence over 
legislative choices. However, we know from experience that 
sometimes these organized interests can be overcome. The history of 
American environmental law has seen so-called “republican 
moments”—instances in which the broad interest in environmental 
protection has overcome powerful, organized interests to produce 
national legislative victories.168 A series of republican moments 
produced one major piece of environmental legislation after another 
during the 1970s.169 These republican moments benefited from 
 
 168. This idea comes from James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct 
Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (1990). Dan 
Farber adapted it to environmental politics in Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in 
Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 60 (1992). 
 169. Indeed, for this reason, the 1970s (or, more accurately, the period running from 
1969 through 1980) is sometimes referred to as “the environmental decade.” See, e.g., LETTIE 
M. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN COURT (1982). In addition to the Clean Air 
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 7401–77671q (2006))  and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 
(2006)), several other foundational environmental laws were enacted during this period, 
including the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006)), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
of 1976, Pub. L. No.  94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6901 
(2006)), the Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2692 (2006)), and the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, 42 
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changes during the 1960s in three of the four elements of electoral 
risk outlined above. First, the growth of mass media and 
popularization of the science of ecology170 helped make 
environmental issues more salient to the general public. Second, 
according to public opinion polling, people cared about 
environmental protection more than ever before (preference 
intensity).171 Third, voters ascribed to Congress the power and 
responsibility to remedy the problem, since neither states172 nor 
courts173 had been able to do so (traceability). In this setting, 
members of Congress acted as political entrepreneurs, concluding 
that it was to their political advantage to respond to this 
groundswell.  
It may also be that these kinds of political choices are about 
more than mere logical calculation. They are also about voters’ 
emotional attachments to favored positions or policies and 
rationalization: the brain’s ability to conflate one’s self-interest with 
one’s idea of what is best or right.174 Behavioral psychologists have 
documented how various psychological “biases” can distort our 
 
U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006), better known as “CERCLA” or “Superfund.” 
 170. Rachel Carson’s seminal best-seller, Silent Spring, was probably the best known 
popularization of the ecological framework. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). 
 171. For a good summary of how the public mobilized to support environmental 
legislation in the early 1970s, see Michael E. Kraft & Norman J. Vig, Environmental Policy 
from the 1970s to the 1990s: Continuity and Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 
1990S: TOWARD A NEW AGENDA 3 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2d ed. 1994). 
 172. For a summary of state and local efforts to regulate air emissions prior to the Clean 
Air Act, see PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 
241–48 (1994). 
 173. Perhaps the quintessential example of the inability or unwillingness of courts to 
provide a comprehensive solution to pollution problems is found in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement 
Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), in which the New York Court of Appeals refused to enjoin 
pollution from a cement plant, noting: 
  A court performs its essential function when it decides the rights of parties 
before it. Its decision of private controversies may sometimes greatly affect public 
issues. . . . 
  Effective control of air pollution is a problem presently far from solution . . . .  
  A court should not try to do this on its own as a by-product of private 
litigation and it seems manifest that the judicial establishment is neither equipped in 
the limited nature of any judgment it can pronounce nor prepared to lay down and 
implement an effective policy for the elimination of air pollution. This is an area 
beyond the circumference of one private lawsuit. 
Id. at 871. 
 174. MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO 
WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 72–76 (2011). 
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ability to gather information and make choices dispassionately and 
objectively.175 Indeed, long before behavioral psychology emerged as 
a discipline, James Madison understood the power of rationalization 
in politics, noting that “[a]s long as the connection subsists between 
[man’s] reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will 
have a reciprocal influence on each other.”176 Thus, it is not simply 
that we voters (and interest groups and firms) want what we want; 
we also interpret the world in ways that justify what we want. Most 
of this rationalization happens on a subconscious level.177 Therefore, 
when business groups pull their legislator away from the median 
voter’s position, neither they nor the legislator see it as a subversion 
of the public interest. Rather, both groups rationalize the choice as 
the “best” possible choice for all concerned. The same can be said 
for republican moments. The environmental movement of the 1960s 
and 70s was motivated not only by logic and science, but also by 
emotion, moral certainty, and passion.178 Political entrepreneurs 
(politicians and lobbyists) aroused that passion. Indeed, political 
entrepreneurs are particularly adept at understanding and influencing 
the way voters perceive issues and constructing appeals that lead 
voters toward some positions and away from others.179 This is part of 
what republican moments are about: not merely the education of 
 
 175. The so-called “confirmation bias,” in particular, can lead voters to seek out 
information (and interpret information) so as to confirm their predispositions or beliefs. See 
generally, SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (1993); 
Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. 
GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998). 
 176. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 177. In the words of cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker: 
Some debates are so entwined with people’s moral identity that one might despair 
that they can ever be resolved by reason and evidence. Social psychologists have 
found that with diverse moral issues, especially those on which liberals and 
conservatives disagree, all combatants are intuitively certain that they are correct and 
that their opponents have ugly ulterior motives. They argue out of respect for the 
social convention that one should always provide reasons for one’s opinions, but 
when an argument is refuted, they don’t change their minds but work harder to find 
a replacement argument. 
STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 281 (2002). 
 178. See e.g., JOHN S. DRYZEK, THE POLITICS OF THE EARTH: ENVIRONMENTAL 
DISCOURSES 27–50, 183–202 (2d ed. 2005). 
 179. This may be what Henry Adams meant when he defined politics as “the systematic 
organization of hatreds.” HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 7 (1918). It 
may also be what Sir Lewis Namier had in mind when he said that “what matters most about 
political ideas is the underlying emotions, the music to which ideas are a mere libretto, often a 
very inferior quality.” SIR LEWIS NAMIER, PERSONALITIES AND POWERS 4 (1955). 
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voters, but the activation of voters’ interest and passion about the 
problem the regulatory legislation seeks to address. 
Why, then, haven’t the efforts of today’s political entrepreneurs 
to activate the greater mass of voters in favor of fundamental energy 
policy reform borne more fruit? If climatologists are correct that the 
earth is warming, that human activity is significantly contributing to 
that warming, and that this poses a significant risk to human welfare, 
why are average voters so much less united in support of those same 
propositions?180 If most economic analyses suggest that the costs of 
continuing to consume fossil fuels at current rates (in terms of 
energy security, climate change, etc.) are likely to be large, and likely 
to exceed the costs of combating climate change, why hasn’t 
Congress enacted major energy policy reform? The short answer is 
that both the issue environment and the political environment are 
different and less supportive of a republican moment now than in the 
1970s. Organized interests have more at stake now, and the central 
issues in the energy policy debate are more complex, both technically 
and politically. Consequently, a republican moment in favor of 
energy policy reform in 2010 is more difficult to achieve. 
B. Organized Interests and Energy Policy Reform 
Obviously, energy policy reform threatens well-heeled, well-
organized, and powerful business interests. The central provisions of 
 
 180. Indeed, the relative apathy and division that characterizes American opinion on 
climate change issues stands in stark contrast to the relative unity among climatologists. Polling 
data seem inconclusive on these issues. In a 2009 poll, Americans were asked, “Do you believe 
climate change is a major threat, a minor threat, or no real threat?” Fifty-eight percent 
responded that it was either a minor threat or no threat at all. Environment, 
POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/enviro.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 
2011). In another poll, only thirty-six percent of Americans attributed global warming to 
human activity, and less than half had heard of “cap and trade” schemes being proposed to 
address it. Press Release, The Pew Research Center, Fewer Americans See Solid Evidence of 
Global Warming 2–3 (Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://people-
press.org/2009/10/22/fewer-americans-see-solid-evidence-of-global-warming. On the other 
hand, polling by Stanford University’s Jon Krosnick points toward majority American support 
for action to combat climate change, though that support does not approach the kind of 
consensus found in the scientific community. See Jon A. Krosnick, Op-Ed., The Climate 
Majority, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2010, at A25; see also Jon Krosnick, Large Majority of 
Americans Support Government Solutions to Address Global Warming, WOODS INST. FOR THE 
ENV’T (June 9, 2010), http://woods.stanford.edu/research/americans-support-govt-
solutions-global-warming.html; Environment, POLLINGREPORT.COM, 
http://www.pollingreport.com/enviro.htm (last accessed Nov. 5, 2011) (the data assembled 
by PollingReport.com seems to support this kind of conceptual support for action). 
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the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer bills pose real risks for 
businesses in the oil and gas industry, the coal industry, the public 
utility industry, the automobile industry, and the real estate and 
homebuilding industries, among others. These industries know 
much more about energy policy reform than the average voter. More 
importantly, they have more at stake in this fight and have active 
lobbyists.181 An older EIA analysis estimated that reducing American 
greenhouse gas emissions to Kyoto levels would reduce coal-fired 
generation by about 50% because a sizable minority of existing coal-
fired power plants would be unable to compete in electricity 
markets.182 That same analysis predicted about a 33% increase in 
electric rates (from 6.1 cents per kwh to 8.1 cents per kwh) were the 
United States to commit itself to meeting its greenhouse gas 
reduction commitments under the Kyoto accord.183 A more recent 
analysis of the Waxman-Markey bill (which would have back loaded 
those costs to utilities by freely allocating pollution allowances in the 
early years of the program) projects only minimal electricity price 
increases at first, but ultimate increases of about 19% (above the 
reference case) by 2030.184  
Oil refineries would face similar costs. Many of these costs would 
be passed on to consumers. Expensive electricity or gasoline not only 
upsets consumers (read: voters), but also poses a risk to the already 
struggling American auto industry whose congressional 
representatives come from political swing states in the Midwest. 
Some fossil fuel companies have indicated that they would favor a 
carbon tax over Clean Air Act regulation or a marketable permit 
system,185 but they prefer no emissions reductions at all.186 Of course, 
 
 181. One article referred to the Waxman-Markey bill as a “Super Bowl” for lobbyists. 
Lisa Lerer & Erika Lovley, Warming Bill the Super Bowl for Lobbyists, POLITICO (June 4, 
2008), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0608/10813.html. One 2009 analysis 
indicated that in 2008 about fifteen percent of all Washington lobbyists were working on the 
subject of climate change. Marianne Lavelle, The Climate Change Lobby Explosion, CENTER 
FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.iwatchnews.org/node/4593.  
 182. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIES FOR 
REDUCING MULTIPLE EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS WITH ADVANCED 
TECHNOLOGY SCENARIOS, at xiv tbl.ES2 (2001), available at http://www.eia.gov/ 
oiaf/servicerpt/eppats/pdf/sroiaf(2001)05.pdf.  
 183. Id. 
 184. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY MARKET AND ECONOMIC 
IMPACTS OF H.R. 2454, THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, at 36–
48 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/hr2454/index.html. 
 185. See Opinion Leaders, CARBON TAX CENTER (May 11, 2009), http:// 
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these interests perceive mandatory greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions as a threat regardless of the regulatory instrument used to 
pursue that goal.  
The Waxman-Markey bill’s proposal for a national RPS also has 
opponents. Some claim that the RPS would lead to a rise in retail 
electricity prices for many customers, not only because renewable 
sources of electricity are more expensive, but also because of the 
need for new high-voltage transmission lines.187 For its part, the EIA 
does not project increases in the national average electricity price 
from a national RPS until after the year 2020, with “peak effects” on 
national average prices remaining below three percent.188 The EIA’s 
analysis of the Waxman-Markey bill projects that it would produce 
significant increases in renewable resources, increases that would 
come at the expense of natural gas and coal generation, threatening 
the coal and gas value chains.189 Not surprisingly, representatives of 
coal and gas interests oppose the bill, arguing that it will increase 
energy costs190 and could lead to job losses that would far 
 
www.carbontax.org/who-supports/opinion-leaders (quoting past statements supportive of a 
carbon tax from CEOs of Exxon-Mobil, Sempra, Dynegy, and Duke Energy). 
 186. Greg Pullian, The Advantages of a Revenue-Neutral Carbon Tax for Emissions 
Reduction, 3 LAMP 25–26 (2009), available at http://www.exxonmobil.com/corporate/ 
files/news_pub_lamp_2009-3.pdf (Exxon Mobil Vice President of Environmental Policy and 
Planning proposing that the carbon tax rate be “updated periodically based on actual 
performance versus the emissions goals established by policy makers”). 
 187. PATRICK SULLIVAN ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF THREE PROPOSED ELECTRICITY STANDARDS 5 (2009), available at 
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/45877.pdf. Proponents have disputed this claim, 
however, and insist that transmission would be much less of an issue for biomass power 
development in the South, which would either require no new infrastructure or involve shorter 
distances, smaller volumes, and lower costs than that which could be required for, for example, 
remote farm locations in the Midwest. FRED SISSINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34116, 
RENEWABLE ENERGY PORTFOLIO STANDARD (RPS): BACKGROUND AND DEBATE OVER A 
NATIONAL REQUIREMENT 8–9 (2007), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/ 
RL34116_20071205.pdf.  
 188. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., IMPACTS OF A 25-PERCENT 
RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY STANDARD AS PROPOSED IN THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND 
SECURITY ACT, at  v–vi (2000) (discussion draft). 
 189. Id. at v. 
 190. The EIA has indicated that a national RPS would have only a moderate effect on 
average prices, adding less than two cents per kwh to rates. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. 
DEP’T OF ENERGY, IMPACTS OF A 15-PERCENT RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD, at v 
(2007), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/prps/index.html. However, 
this mean effect may belie widely varying effects in different parts of the country; in most 
places, two cents per kwh represents a fifteen to thirty percent increase in electricity rates. The 
U.S. Department of Energy’s Green Power Network publishes an index of the premiums 
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outnumber any jobs created to meet a government-mandated 
RPS.191 If members of Congress suspect that their constituents are 
unwilling to pay two cents more per kwh for electricity, they are 
unlikely to support a national RPS. 
Politicians from the southeastern United States argue further 
that a national RPS represents a wealth transfer from “renewable 
resource poor” parts of the country (largely in the Southeast) to 
renewable resource rich parts of the country (the windy plains and 
coasts, and the sunny Southwest).192 This argument is not terribly 
compelling because the status quo benefits states that are blessed 
with natural deposits of fossil fuels or that chose to shift 
environmental costs to the rest of us by burning those fuels.193 
Nonetheless, the fact remains that legislators from the southeastern 
United States appear to see the national RPS as threat to their 
constituents, and they oppose it.  
Certainly, the legislative process to date reflects the impact of 
industry and regional opposition to fundamental energy policy 
reform. During early consideration of the Waxman-Markey bill, 
Republicans in the Energy and Commerce Committee offered more 
than 400 amendments in an unsuccessful attempt to kill the bill. 
Energy industry lobbyists secured the removal of the original 
provision requiring that 100% of the tradable greenhouse gas 
emissions permits be auctioned off to industry; that provision was 
replaced by one calling for (mostly) free distribution of permits. For 
its part, the Kerry-Boxer bill did not include provision for a national 
 
electric utilities charge for renewable power in various states. While these data do not measure 
the overall cost impacts of an RPS, they do seem to reflect a larger than two cents per kwh 
premium for renewable power in some parts of the country. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, GREEN 
Pricing Utility Programs by State, GREEN POWER NETWORK (Dec. 16, 2010), 
http://apps3.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/markets/pricing.shtml?page=1. 
 191. 110 CONG. REC. H9849, 9851 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 2007). 
 192. Specifically, they have claimed that a renewables standard would “create hardship for 
states and regions with low amounts of renewable resources . . . .” These opponents have cited 
the southeastern states as an example, claiming that even though these states are producing 
some biomass power technologies, these technologies are “not yet ready for commercial use.” 
SISSINE, supra note 187, at 8–10, 12. 
 193. That is, there is no inherent justice in the status quo, and no inherent injustice in a 
policy change that alters that status quo. Second, even if the southeastern states cannot exploit 
solar and wind resources, they have an ample supply of biomass, which qualifies as a renewable 
resource under the national RPS provisions contained in the Waxman-Markey bill. H.R. 2454, 
111th Cong. § 126 (2009).  
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RPS at all, in part because of opposition of southeastern state 
senators.  
Consequently, the Kerry-Boxer bill was stalled in the Senate in 
October of 2009 when the “Gang of Three” Senators Kerry and 
Graham (not yet joined by Lieberman) first announced their plans to 
seek the sixty votes needed to force a climate bill onto the Senate 
floor. They indicated that they would include additional nuclear 
power incentives and domestic drilling provisions in their proposed 
legislative language to “win over undecided Democrats and at least a 
handful of Republicans.”194 They apparently also included provisions 
allocating funding for carbon sequestration technology (to appease 
Democrats from states that produce or use large amounts of coal)195 
and lowered the greenhouse gas emissions reduction requirements 
below those proposed in the Kerry-Boxer bill, in part to appease 
Senator Max Baucus (D–Mont.), who had voted against Kerry-Boxer 
in committee.196 Other concessions included exempting the oil 
industry from cap-and-trade regulation and instead subjecting 
transportation fuels to a carbon tax,197 and delaying the imposition of 
cap-and-trade requirements on manufacturers.198 In making these 
changes, the Gang of Three’s goal seems to have been to win 
business and regional support or to reduce business and regional 
opposition to this legislation.199  
 
 194. Dean Scott, Kerry Sees Delay in Unveiling Framework; Murkowski Ponders “Net 
Zero” Carbon Tax, 40 ENVTL. REP. CURRENT DEV. 2755, 2756 (2009). 
 195. Coral Davenport, Climate Bill Advances in GOP’s Absence, 2009 CQ WEEKLY 2594, 
available at http://library.cqpress.com.ezproxy.lib.utexas.edu/cqweekly/weeklyreport111-
000003243411. 
 196. Leora Falk, Senators Seek 17 Percent Emissions Cut, Support for Nuclear Power in 
Compromise, 40 ENVTL. REP. CURRENT DEV. 2814, 2815 (2009). 
 197. While oil companies have fiercely opposed any new regulations or fees, “they like 
that as an industry they will not be hit with new production fees, since the cost will go directly 
to consumers.” Coral Davenport, A Plan Designed to Stem Opposition, 2010 CQ WKLY. 976. 
 198. Id. This concession was sought by the National Association of Manufacturers and 
Rust Belt lawmakers. The National Association of Manufacturers had earlier issued an analysis 
of the Waxman-Markey bill that had predicted it would reduce American GDP levels by as 
much as 2.4 % (or $571 billion). AM. COUNCIL FOR CAPITAL FORMATION & NAT’L ASS’N OF 
MFRS., ANALYSIS OF THE WAXMAN-MARKEY BILL 4 (2009), available at 
http://www.accf.org/media/dynamic/3/media_387.pdf. Still, Rust Belt Democrats want an 
even better deal and have indicated that their support for the delayed cap-and-trade program is 
contingent upon other “sweeteners such as new government loans for clean energy technology 
manufacturing, cost-containment measures for manufacturers facing higher energy bills, and 
the creation of a ‘carbon tariff’ imposing fees on imported goods from countries that don’t 
regulate carbon pollution.” Davenport, supra note 197, at 977. 
 199. As Senator Graham said, “At the end of the day, if the environmental policies we are 
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The energy industry may have another reason to be even more 
determined in its opposition to current energy legislation now than it 
was to energy and environmental legislation in the 1970s. In the era 
before restructuring of gas and electricity markets, gas and electric 
utilities were much more vertically integrated than they are now, and 
most of the costs imposed on the gas and electric utility industry by 
statutes like the NGPA, PURPA, the Clean Air Act, and the Clean 
Water Act were recoverable from their customers through rates.200 
Wholesale and retail electric rates were set by regulators (the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission and state PUCs, respectively); these 
agencies permitted utilities to recover fuel and regulatory costs from 
their customers.201 Consequently, while price increases back then 
might have led to some conservation and fuel switching, individual 
companies had no need to fear widespread loss of customers as a 
result of these policy changes. By contrast, today’s energy utilities 
face a much less secure environment. As described above in Part I, 
wholesale sellers (and some retail sellers) now compete for customers 
and sell their energy at market rates. Companies whose electric 
generation mix is heavily dependent upon coal will be hit harder by 
greenhouse gas emissions regulation. We can expect those companies 
to be doubly nervous about energy policy reform. 
C. The Issue Environment and Party Politics 
Irrespective of the strength and determination of the opponents 
of reform, the question remains why pro-reform political 
entrepreneurs have not been better able to activate voters in support 
of reform. After all, the energy and environmental legislation of the 
1970s also posed risks to the energy industry. By deregulating 
natural gas wellhead prices, the NGPA of 1978 posed a risk to gas 
utilities that the gas they purchased might become much more 
 
seeking are not good for business, we will not get 60 votes.” Falk, supra note 196, at 2815; see 
also Press Release, U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham, Graham on Energy Independence and 
Climate Change (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://tinyurl.com/yjgall9.  
 200.  Fuel costs are routinely passed through in traditional rate cases. Investments in 
technology to comply with environmental regulation are part of the utility’s “rate base,” the 
capital investment on which it is authorized to earn a fair return. Only investments which are 
deemed to be imprudently made are disallowed, and investments associated with mandatory 
environmental controls will always be considered prudent. 
 201.  U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF 
THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY (2000), available at http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/ 
chg_stru_update/update2000.pdf. 
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expensive, and the price more volatile. Its companion, PURPA, 
posed a similar risk to electric utilities by requiring them to purchase 
power from new merchant electric generating plants. Likewise, the 
Clean Air Act increased the cost of exploiting fossil fuels for energy, 
and triggered stiff opposition from the energy industry. If that 
opposition could be overcome then, what makes the politics of 
energy policy reform today any different?  
1. Technical complexity and salience 
The technical complexity of the issues involved complicates the 
task of rallying mass support for reform and can make the current 
generation of environmental, energy security, and efficiency 
problems seem less salient. The energy and environmental legislation 
of the 1970s was aimed at problems that were, compared to the 
problem of climate change, relatively immediate and tractable. 
Politicians could make a relatively straightforward case to voters that 
passage of regulatory legislation would address easily identifiable 
harms of pollution or security of energy supply. Voters in the 1970s 
worried about the price of energy, but they worried far more about 
perceived threats to energy security or to health and the 
environment. When the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act were 
enacted in the early 1970s, voters could see (and smell) the harm 
that the laws would avoid. Air pollution in cities was far worse than it 
is today. The Santa Barbara oil spill, the Cuyahoga River fire, and the 
“death” of Lake Erie, all represented tangible, immediate costs that 
voters wanted to avoid. Simultaneously, the oil shocks of the 1970s 
created real fears about energy security. These catalyzing events 
helped political entrepreneurs activate pro-reform voters and 
mobilize support for environmental and energy legislation of the 
1970s.  
Today’s political entrepreneurs have been attempting to use 
catalyzing events to mobilize support for fighting climate change and 
increasing energy security. Former Vice President Al Gore and the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) won (jointly) a 
Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts to educate the public about the 
risks associated with climate change.202 The Pew Center for Climate 
Change and countless other nongovernmental organizations seek the 
 
      202. Walter Gibbs, Gore Shares Peace Prize for Climate Change Work, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
13, 2007, at A1. 
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same goals. The sponsors of energy policy reform legislation in the 
House and Senate are political entrepreneurs as well. Despite these 
efforts, the political calculus remains difficult. The effects of climate 
change—receding polar ice caps and glaciers, and the threat of slowly 
rising sea levels—are important; but they are not nearly as immediate 
to most American voters as were the environmental problems voters 
faced in the 1970s. Moreover, climatologists do not agree on the 
nature and distribution of the likely impacts of climate change, their 
magnitude, the degree to which humans will be able to adapt in ways 
that minimize impacts, etc. Opponents of reform can exploit these 
divisions, portraying the science behind climate change as shaky or 
uncertain.203 Consequently, while opponents can make relatively 
confident and specific claims about the costs associated with 
greenhouse gas emissions limitations, efficiency codes, tighter CAFE 
standards, or a national RPS, proponents of reform cannot respond 
nearly as confidently or specifically about the costs of inaction.204  
2. Traceability 
During the 1970s, it was clear that the benefits of reform 
legislation would accrue mostly to Americans.205 Congress reasonably 
 
      203.Indeed, opponents have done just that, particularly in connection with a series of 
revelations in late 2009 and early 2010 which they called “climategate.” These included 
revelations of errors in the most recent IPCC assessment and disclosure of embarrassing e-
mails from a major climate research center. These revelations did not really undermine the 
scientific foundation of the case for anthropogenic-based global warming. In a recent edition 
of the journal Science, 255 members of the National Academy of Sciences published a letter 
addressing climategate, stating that 
[T]here is nothing remotely identified in the recent events that changes the 
fundamental conclusions about climate change: 
  (i) The planet is warming due to increased concentrations of heat-trapping 
gases in our atmosphere [and]. . . .  
  (ii) Most of the increase in the concentration of these gases over the last 
century is due to human activities, especially the burning of fossil fuels and 
deforestation. 
Jennifer Sills, ed., Climate Change and the Integrity of Science, 328 SCIENCE 689, 689 (2010). 
Nevertheless, climategate seems to have undermined public confidence in climate change 
science. The Climate Action Network, which follows public opinion polling data in the wake of 
climategate demonstrates this phenomenon. See Tracking Public Attitudes About Climate 
Change—Latest Polls, CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK (June 16, 2011), 
http://www.usclimatenetwork.org/hot-topics/climate-polling. 
 204. See MASTRANDREA, supra note 57, at 30–35 (discussing the effect of assumptions 
about adaptation on cost estimates). 
 205. Certainly, the Clean Air Act benefited Canadians by imposing emissions controls on 
midwestern American power plants. Furthermore, we were not certain of it at the time, but 
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expected then that most voters would see those benefits within their 
lifetimes.206 Thus, voters could expect not only to bear the costs of 
pollution control, but also to capture most of the benefits. Likewise, 
it was relatively easy for voters in 1978 to see how deregulating 
natural gas prices might lead to increases in supply and decreases in 
consumption, thereby alleviating the perceived natural gas shortage. 
It was easy to understand how PURPA’s financial incentives for 
alternative energy projects might lead to a more diversified and 
efficient electricity supply. Consequently, legislators could take credit 
for addressing these problems and for any progress that could be 
traced back to those statutes. Indeed, as it happened, most of these 
statutes produced results relatively quickly. The deregulation of 
natural gas prices rebalanced gas markets by increasing supply and 
reducing demand far more quickly than legislators expected.207 The 
Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act represent enormous success 
stories, having drastically reduced air and water emissions in real 
terms, despite growth in population, economic activity, and vehicle 
miles traveled since their passage.208  
By contrast, greenhouse gas emissions reductions, increased 
energy efficiency, and a national RPS are all aimed (at least partly) at 
the problem of climate change; their costs will fall on today’s voters, 
while most of the benefits will accrue to future generations of 
Americans and to citizens of other countries. This makes it far more 
difficult for political entrepreneurs to activate today’s voters in favor 
of reform. Since some greenhouse gases persist in the atmosphere for 
more than fifty years after being emitted, the benefits of action now 
will accrue not so much to this generation or the next, but to the 
ones after that. Similarly, some voters fear that in the absence of 
emissions reductions in China and India,209 the benefits of 
 
Europeans were to benefit from American emissions reductions as well. We now know that 
some pollutants travel across the oceans to be deposited on continents other than those from 
which they were emitted.  
 206. The effects of most emissions under the Clean Air Act were felt locally. We now 
have a better understanding of the way in which sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides are 
transported in the atmosphere and recognize that they can sometimes cross entire oceans to be 
deposited on different continents. However, this is the exception rather than the rule.  
 207. Pierce, supra note 11.  
 208. Robin Lloyd, Success Stories: Cleaning Up Planet Earth, LIVE SCIENCE (April 22, 
2009, 4:33 AM), http://www.livescience.com/environment/090422-earth-day-success.html. 
 209. Since Kyoto, negotiations over the next steps in combating climate change have 
broken down repeatedly over the question of whether developing nations like China and India 
ought to commit to emissions reductions. They have steadfastly refused to do so, which was a 
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greenhouse gas emissions reductions may never be realized. It is one 
thing for members of Congress to urge voters to incur the costs of 
combating global warming because the United States has 
contributed so much to the problem; it is more difficult to do so if 
the benefits may never be realized because emissions growth in the 
developing world will overwhelm American emissions reductions.210  
Even if one accepts the sensible rejoinder that the industrialized 
world ought to be the first mover on this issue because it built its 
wealth on the back of uncontrolled fossil fuel emissions,211 the nature 
of the greenhouse effect is such that emissions reductions in the 
United States (or Europe or anywhere) accrue to the benefit of the 
entire world. This is the tragedy of the commons212 on its grandest 
(and, therefore, most powerful) scale yet. It may only be fair to 
future generations and to citizens of the world for the United States 
to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions now, but it is very difficult for 
members of Congress to enact legislation when the costs will fall 
entirely on their constituents and most of the benefits will fall 
elsewhere and in the distant future. For members of Congress, the 
politics of energy policy reform are very difficult indeed.  
3. Policy complexity 
Just as the technical complexity of climate change (the relative 
uncertainty about the magnitude and distribution of its effects) 
makes it harder for political entrepreneurs to mobilize support for 
energy policy reform, so too does its policy complexity. Even where 
there is agreement on the need for action, there is widespread 
disagreement among social scientists and policy analysts about how to 
 
sticking point at the most recent negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009. John M. 
Broder, Many Goals Remain Unmet in Five Nations Climate Deal, N.Y. TIMES, December 19, 
2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/science/earth/ 
19climate.html. 
 210.  There is evidence that voters care more about local environmental issues than global 
ones. See David M. Konisky et al., Environmental Policy Attitudes: Issues, Geographical Scale, 
and Political Trust, 89 SOC. SCI. Q. 1066 (2008). 
 211. The developing world is at a point on its growth curve that the developed world was 
at long before it began regulating air emissions from fossil fuel combustion. There is a strong 
argument that it would be unfair for Americans to insist now that China foregoes the kind of 
growth that Americans enjoyed—that is, growth based upon the exploitation of cheap energy 
without regulation designed to internalize social and environmental costs. According to this 
argument, at the very least, the United States ought to limit its own greenhouse gas emissions 
before it insists that China do so. 
 212. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
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reform our energy policy. These disagreements undermine the ability 
of political entrepreneurs to make a simple and straightforward case 
for reform to their constituents.  
For example, economists extol the virtues of carbon taxes, 
arguing that a tax (once set at the correct level) is the most efficient 
way to internalize the costs of greenhouse gas emissions.213 
Regulated firms also tend to prefer taxes to tradable permit systems 
because they provide cost certainty: the cost of acquiring tradable 
permits can vary over time according to the forces of supply and 
demand, while the tax rate tends to be more stable and 
predictable.214 However, environmental groups care less about cost 
certainty and more about predicting the level of pollution.215 A cap 
and trade marketable permit system provides the certainty 
environmentalists want by capping total emissions at a 
predetermined level.  
Because new taxes seem to be a political nonstarter in the 
American policy debate, both the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Boxer 
bills propose tradable permit systems for managing greenhouse gas 
emissions. While cap and trade is more cost efficient than traditional 
permitting,216 it is vulnerable to other criticisms. For example, some 
critics of tradable permits point to problems with the European 
Union’s carbon trading scheme217 and to fears that speculators will 
make prices in these markets high or volatile.218 These criticisms feed 
 
 213. Economists have preferred environmental taxes since the time of A.C. Pigou, who 
first advocated taxing pollution. See A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1932); see 
also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
(2d ed. 1975). 
 214. ExxonMobil, for example, has taken this position. Pullian, supra note 186. 
 215. See, e.g., James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity 
Aim?, 2 OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 229 (2008), available at 
http://pubs.giss.nasa.gov/docs/2008/2008_Hansen_etal.pdf (high-profile climatologist 
suggesting “an initial objective of reducing atmospheric CO2 to 350 ppm,” which later inspired 
a 350 movement largely organized by the environmental group, 350.org). 
 216. It is more efficient in that it sought to allow firms within an industry to accomplish 
pollution reductions at a lower cost than traditional permitting. 
 217. The EU scheme unfolded in two stages. During the first stage, too many permits 
were distributed (and hoarded by their owners). When the glut of permits was revealed, the 
price of permits dropped precipitously, from a high of more than thirty euros per ton to a low 
of less than four euros per ton. Frank J. Convery & Luke Redmond, Market and Price 
Developments in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 1 REV. OF ENVTL. ECON. 
POL’Y 88, 103 (2007). 
 218. See, e.g., Robert J. Shapiro & Elaine C. Kamarck, Goldman Scandal Erodes Case for 
Cap and Trade, HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 10, 2010, http:// 
DO NOT DELETE 12/13/2011 4:54 PM 
1561 Regulation, “Republican Moments” 
 1613 
into a public perception that these kinds of markets may be 
unworkable and risky. Opponents of reform have tried to exploit this 
disagreement and confusion over the efficacy of various regulatory 
instruments by, for example, calling the cap and trade proposals of 
Waxman-Markey “cap and tax.”219 From the left, environmental 
justice advocates worry that a marketable permit program can create 
emissions “hotspots” around facilities that buy permits, though this 
issue is more of a concern with respect to emissions of pollutants 
other than GHGs, which tend to disperse in the atmosphere.220 
Some proponents of reform are lukewarm—even skeptical—
about our ability to attack the problem at the tailpipe or smokestack. 
The real problem, they say, is not how much pollution we emit, but 
rather our use of fossil fuels in the first place. Proponents of this view 
tend to favor policies that promote technological change, efficiency, 
and conservation. One proponent of a national RPS, Lincoln Davies, 
argues that the RPS is a more effective way to combat climate change 
than emissions regulations.221 A closely related view contends that 
the only reasonable policies are those that focus on developing the 
low-carbon or carbon-free technologies that developing countries 
like China or India can use to grow. According to this view, until the 
developed world recognizes the developing world’s right to use as 
much energy per capita as the developed world does now, we cannot 
make any reasonable progress on the issue of climate change.222 For 
 
www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-j-shapiro/goldman-scandal-erodes-ca_b_554137.html 
(contributor to progressive news website questioning the ability of regulators to “effectively 
oversee a new carbon market”). 
 219. See, e.g., Editorial, The Cap and Tax Fiction, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2009, at A12. 
 220. However, a forthcoming assessment by David Adelman shows that in most parts of 
the country, industrial sources contribute a small percentage of the cancer risk from air toxics, 
even in places where those industrial emissions are concentrated. David Adelman, The 
Collective Origins of Toxic Air Pollution: Implications for Greenhouse Gas Trading Regimes 
and Industrial Hot Spots (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 221. See Lincoln Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. 
L. REV. 1341, 1341–1403 (2010). 
 222.  Rutgers’s law professor Howard Latin takes this view. He says,  
Even Herculean mitigation efforts will take several decades at best before we can 
make major progress in transforming these GHG sources into climate-safe 
alternatives. Utopian visions of avoiding climate “tipping points” in the next decade 
are completely unrealistic. If there are looming tipping points, which may well be 
true, they are inescapably going to be tipped or tripped over. My concern is that 
emergency efforts to prevent what cannot be avoided are likely to lead to waste, 
foolishness, international conflicts and general disillusionment on an epic scale. I 
believe we must start NOW to begin the transition to a carbon-free energy system 
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their part, energy efficiency proponents see far more promise in 
energy efficiency than in emissions regulation; this reflects the belief 
that there is more environmental bang for the buck in efficiency 
improvements, and the fear that emissions reduction legislation 
seems like a politically intractable problem.223 When supporters of 
reform cannot agree on the wisdom of the instruments of reform, it 
makes the job of pro-reform political entrepreneurs that much more 
difficult.  
There is another way in which policy complexity can undermine 
the mobilization of support for energy reform, particularly in 
connection with large, complex bills like Waxman-Markey. Each of 
the regulatory instruments included in the bill advances some of the 
bill’s goals, but undermines others. For example, policies promoting 
the substitution of renewable electricity for fossil fuels will produce 
environmental benefits (reductions in greenhouse gas and other 
fossil fuel emissions) and reduce dependence on foreign oil; however, 
they also reduce reliability of supply because renewable sources like 
wind and solar power are intermittent.224 Similarly, policies 
promoting the substitution of electric vehicles for gasoline powered 
vehicles reduce dependence upon foreign oil, bringing all of the 
security and foreign policy benefits that reduced energy dependence 
entails. However, if the electricity used to power electric cars comes 
in large part from coal (as it does in most of the country today), that 
transition may exacerbate the global warming problem. Likewise, we 
 
and economy. Efforts to solve global warming by GHG emissions reductions 
strategies, rather than GHG replacement strategies, cannot realistically succeed over 
the short-term or the long-term or any term . . . . 
Howard Latin, Comment to Varied Views on Poverty and Climate, NY TIMES DOT EARTH 
(Nov. 28, 2007 5:05 AM), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/27/varied-views-
on-poverty-and-climate-change/. 
 223. See Dernbach, supra note 92, at 10,003–18. 
 224. We do not yet have the capability to store electricity in large amounts, and these 
sources produce power only when the wind blows or the sun shines. Some wind and solar 
stations are backed up by more conventionally fueled plants, like natural gas facilities. The need 
for this kind of support adds costs to what are already relatively expensive technologies for 
producing electricity. Researchers and entrepreneurs are working on coupling wind and solar 
power with on-site storage capabilities, such as compressed air and flywheels, but none of these 
technologies has developed sufficiently to be commercialized. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., 
Electric Power in the Carbon Constrained World, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
821, 870 n.444 (2010) (“Other storage systems that have yet to be commercially proven 
include batteries, compressed air storage, pumped hydroelectricity, fly wheels, and molten 
salts.”); Drew Thornley, Texas Wind Energy: Past, Present, and Future, 4 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. 
& POL’Y J. 69, 97–103 (2009). 
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can reduce emissions of greenhouse gases significantly by moving 
away from coal-fired power to solar power; however, coal is a 
relatively cheap and plentiful domestic source of energy, while most 
solar photovoltaic cells are made with imported silicon.225  
Thus, modern energy policy reform requires an extraordinary 
number of hard choices that involve tradeoffs and great uncertainty. 
These tensions complicate an already difficult and complex debate 
even further.  
4. Party, ideology, and emotion 
Finally, the partisan political environment in 2010 seems less 
conducive to a pro-reform republican moment than the partisan 
political environment of the 1970s. Whether or not American 
politics was less ideological or partisan in the 1970s (and it is not 
clear that it was), it is clear that in the 1970s the two major political 
parties did not differ so distinctly on energy and environmental 
policy issues as they do now. At the time the Clean Air Act and 
Clean Water Act were passed, both major political parties claimed 
the mantle of environmental leadership. A Republican president, 
Richard Nixon, signed into law both of these landmark 
environmental statutes, having previously created the Environmental 
Protection Agency by executive order.226 A Democrat, Jimmy Carter, 
signed the NGPA, a statute whose deregulatory policy aims we 
might associate with the Republican Party today. Even as recently as 
twenty years ago, Republican George H. W. Bush signed the 1990 
Clean Air Act amendments creating the acid rain program and ran 
for office claiming to be “the environmental president.”227 We do 
not see that sort of bipartisanship on environmental and energy 
issues much anymore; to the contrary, partisan differences are now 
the norm.228 The 2010 Senate’s Gang of Three represented an 
 
 225. There are, of course, rejoinders to these arguments. Some photovoltaic solar 
technologies use cadmium or other silicon substitutes. Concentrated solar technologies do not 
rely upon rare elements like silicon. And solar power is not the only alternative to coal. Nuclear 
power is a more likely substitute, since both coal and nuclear energy serve as base load sources 
of supply. Uranium is a relatively secure fuel source in that we produce it domestically and can 
import it from stable, friendly regimes (e.g., Canada or Australia). 
 226. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (July 9, 1970), 
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. 4321 (2010), and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970). 
 227. LESLIE DALE FELDMAN & ROSANNA PEROTTI, HONOR AND LOYALTY: INSIDE THE 
POLITICS OF THE GEORGE H.W. BUSH WHITE HOUSE 8 (2002).  
 228.  Riley Dunlap, a leading authority on environmental opinion, has documented this 
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attempt at bipartisanship in the Senate; but three senators does not a 
“gang” make, and the gang lost its only Republican member shortly 
after its creation due to an unrelated partisan dispute.229 Lately, 
conflict over energy and the environment—like other conflicts over 
major healthcare, financial, and energy legislation—seems to break 
sharply along partisan lines.230  
Ideological polarization within Congress on energy and 
environmental issues is part of a larger trend. Political scientists agree 
that party polarization in Congress has been increasing over the last 
forty years.231 This polarization manifests itself in a variety of ways, 
including increases in party line voting and differences between the 
 
polarization process, tracing it to the early 1980s. He says that opinion on environmental 
issues is most polarized among elites. See Riley E. Dunlap & Aaron M. McCright, A Widening 
Gap: Republican and Democratic Views on Climate Change, 50 ENV’T 26, 28 (2008); see also 
Konisky et al., supra note 210, at 1066, 1077–78 (finding partisan differences between 
Democrats and Republicans on support for environmental policy initiatives and a strong 
connection between political ideology and support for environmental regulation).  
 229. See Stephen Power, U.S. News: One Top Obama Goal, Climate Bill, at Risk, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 26, 2010, at A4 (reporting that Republican Sen. Lindsey Graham announced his 
departure from the effort because Democratic leaders wanted to address immigration 
legislation in advance of energy legislation). 
 230. Richard Lazarus recounted the growing partisan division on environmental issues in 
2003. Using the League of Conservation Voters environmental scorecard of members of 
Congress, Lazarus illustrates a growing partisanship in voting on environmental issues in 
Congress. See Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of “Republican Moment” in Environmental 
Law, 87 MINN. L. REV. 999, 1011–13 (2003). Of course, the League of Conservation Voters 
assign members of Congress voting scores based upon its desire to move members toward a 
more pro-environmental position. In that sense, its scores are not objective measures of 
environmentalism. However, Lazarus’s observations seem consistent with the dwindling 
numbers of liberal and moderate Republicans and conservative Democrats in Congress since 
1970. See infra notes 23131–34 and accompanying text.  
 231. There are a variety of measures used to document this polarization. One of the 
better known is Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal’s so-called ‘DW-NOMINATE” data, 
which places members of Congress on an ideological spectrum based upon their voting 
behavior. For a thorough explanation of these data and how they document increasing 
polarization in American politics, see NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD 
ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 
(2006). For a striking visual illustration of polarization in Congress, see Keith Poole’s webpage 
at http://voteview.com/polarizedamerica.asp. For a good overview of the various databases 
and theories of congressional polarization, and an integration of some of those theories and 
data, see SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS (2008); see also JOHN H. 
ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES?: THE ORIGINS AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN 
AMERICA (1995); KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997); Morris P. Fiorina & Samuel J. Abrams, 
Political Polarization in the American Public, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 563 (2008); Morris P. 
Fiorina, Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting at 
Chicago, Illinois, Whatever Happened to the Median Voter? (Apr. 15–17, 1999).  
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parties’ voting behavior.232 This trend has been ascribed by political 
scientists to a number of factors, including increasing ideological 
homogeneity in congressional districts233 and various kinds of 
institutional changes that affect how parties manage congressional 
business.234 Whatever the reasons, parties have become more 
ideologically pure and ideologically further from one another over 
time, making bipartisan cooperation toward energy reform that 
much more difficult.  
There is another important difference in the political setting 
today compared with the 1970s. The environmental legislation of 
the 1970s was part of a family of left-leaning social movements, 
which included the civil rights movement, the consumer movement, 
and the antiwar movement. The environmental movement produced 
republican moments in Congress in part because the fervor and 
energy of the general public was behind it. The same can be said of 
the energy bills of the late 1970s, which then President Jimmy 
Carter described as “the moral equivalent of war.”235 Because of this 
fervor, members of Congress in the 1970s might reasonably have 
worried more about how their actions might affect the votes of those 
favoring regulation and reform than those opposing it. That does 
not seem to be the case today. To the contrary, nowadays most of 
the populist energy seems to be coming from the right wing of the 
political spectrum: right wing populists (who often oppose federal 
regulation of the private sector) seem to be the modern analogues of 
the left-wing populists of the 60s and 70s (who demanded federal 
regulation). To today’s member of Congress, environmental issues 
 
 232. POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 2311, at 88; THERIAULT, supra note 231, at 3–
9.  
 233. Some ascribe this increasing homogeneity to redistricting. See e.g., Jamie Carson, 
Michael H. Crespin, Charles J. Finocchiaro, & David W. Rohde, Paper presented at the 
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Linking Congressional Districts 
Across Time: Redistricting and Party Polarization in Congress (2004). Others argue that voters 
are segregating themselves ideologically. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. STONECASH, MARK D. BREWER, 
& MARK D. MARIANI, DIVERGING PARTIES: SOCIAL CHANGE, REALIGNMENT, AND PARTY 
POLARIZATION (2003); Delia Baldassarri & Andrew Gelman, Partisans Without Constraint: 
Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion, 114 AM. J. SOC. 408 (2008). 
Still others see party activists as exacerbating partisan conflict. Geoffrey C. Layman et al., 
Activists and Conflict Extension in American Party Politics, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 324 
(2010). 
 234. For a good summary of the institutional explanations of party polarization, see 
generally THERIAULT, supra note 231, at 3–9.  
 235. Jimmy Carter, President of the U.S., Speech to the Nation (Apr. 18, 1977), 
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/carter/filmmore/ps_energy.html. 
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may seem far more salient to those who oppose action than to those 
who favor it.  
There may be another dynamic at work here, one that helps 
explain the inability of pro-reform political entrepreneurs to move 
public opinion and activate voters. Some analysts point to 
psychological factors—the confirmation bias and the more general 
human tendency to rationalize to reduce cognitive dissonance—that 
can lead voters to harden their positions on “hot button” issues like 
climate change. In a recent paper, Dan Kahan, Hank Jenkins-Smith, 
and Donald Braman examined the question of why voters cling to 
assessments of risk—including assessment of the risks posed by 
climate change—that differ so significantly from the prevailing 
opinion of experts or scientists.236 The authors chose a series of issues 
on which (i) experts had reached something close to consensus, but 
(ii) public opinion lagged behind that consensus. The authors 
hypothesized that people who tend toward more hierarchical and 
individualistic worldviews (“hierarchical individualists”), would tend 
to discredit the scientific basis of global warming than people who 
tend toward more egalitarian and communitarian worldviews 
(“egalitarian communitarians”). They found that when presented 
with a fictional scientific expert advocating the propositions that 
global temperatures are increasing and that human activity is causing 
global warming hierarchical individualists were more likely to 
discredit the expertise of the expert making those claims.237 The 
subjects of the experiment tended to rationalize to avoid cognitive 
dissonance.238 Certainly, this “cultural cognition of risk” could be 
part of the reason why public perceptions of climate change risks 
(and support for reform) lag behind those of climatologists and 
other experts.  
 
 236. Dan Kahan, Hank Jenkins-Smith & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition of 
Scientific Consensus (Yale Law Sch., Research, Working Paper No. 205, 2011).  
 237. As the authors note, this experiment builds upon work in psychology on “identity-
protective cognition,” which says that individuals tend to resist factual claims that behavior and 
importance to their cultural roles is harmful and should be regulated. See David K. Sherman & 
Geoffrey L. Coleman, The Psychology of Self-Defense: Self Affirmation Theory, 38 ADVANCES 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 183 (2006). Another mechanism supporting this hypothesis 
would be the “assimilation bias,” which contends that people assimilate facts in ways that 
support their cultural predispositions and undermine opposing predispositions. 
 238. Kahan et al., supra note 236, at 13. This kind of rationalization is not limited to 
hierarchical individualists. The authors found that egalitarian communitarians discredited the 
existence of a scientific consensus in favor of the safety of geological disposal of nuclear waste. 
Id. at 16. 
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Data from a recent poll seem to support the notion that climate 
change skeptics have hardened their positions in this way. A May 
2011 joint report issued by Yale University’s Project on Climate 
Change Communication and George Mason University Center on 
Climate Change Communication separated poll respondents into six 
groups representing the continuum of climate change opinion, as 
reflected in Figure 4. Those at the left end of the continuum had the 
strongest belief in global warming science, were most concerned 
about the problem, and were the most motivated to do something 
about it. Those at the right end of the continuum had the weakest 
belief in climate change science and were the least concerned and 
motivated to take action. 
 
Respondents in the “Dismissive” group reported that they were 
less uncertain than any other group about the science of climate 
change and more likely than any other group to say that they were 
well-informed about the subject. While there was “low” recognition 
of the extent of scientific agreement on climate science among all the 
respondents, only five percent of the Disengaged, Doubtful, and 
Dismissive recognized the actual levels of scientific agreement on the 
subject. Not surprisingly, these groups were also far less likely to 
trust expert scientific groups on the subject of climate change.239  
If a hardening of opinion is indeed occurring, one wonders if it is 
associated with changes in the way voters obtain information. 
 
 239. ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., YALE UNIVERSITY’S PROJECT ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE COMMC’N & GEORGE MASON UNIV. CTR. ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, 
GLOBAL WARMING’S SIX AMERICAS IN MAY 2011, at 6–7 (2011) available at 
http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/SixAmericasMay2011.pdf. 
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Behavioral psychologists have long documented the tendency of 
humans to seek affirmation of their preexisting views.240 Is this easier 
to do in the information age? In the 1970s, most voters got their 
policy and political information from the relatively few (and largely 
mainstream) news sources available. Now voters face a much wider 
variety of news sources. This means that voters can find more and 
better information if they are willing to look for it. It also means that 
it is much easier for voters to find information sources that are 
tailored to their particular point of view or which tend to confirm 
their worldviews.241 In the Yale/George Mason report, those on the 
left hand side of the climate change opinion spectrum reported more 
interest in gathering new information about climate change than 
those on the right hand side of the spectrum. If those on the right 
are turning a blind eye to climate change science, this dynamic makes 
it harder for political entrepreneurs to move public opinion, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of an energy policy reform republican 
moment in the near future.  
IV. CONCLUSION: WHERE TO FROM HERE? 
All of this sounds very pessimistic. Even if it is true that the 
benefits of energy policy reform exceed the costs, it seems as though 
the truth cannot prevail. Have organized interests become too adept 
at exploiting voters’ rational ignorance and psychological 
predispositions? Are voters unwilling to face “inconvenient truths” 
and/or make the investments necessary to prevent harm to future 
generations? Or is it simply that these issues are not yet politically 
mature, such that the voting public does not yet fully understand or 
appreciate the kind of fundamental energy policy reforms Congress is 
now considering? 
First, we should remember that the absence of congressional 
action is not the absence of progress. Significant minorities of the 
American public are activated on energy policy reform issues and are 
 
 240. See PINKER, supra note 177. 
 241. Some offer this as an explanation for increasing political polarization generally. See, 
e.g., CASS SUNSTEIN, ECHO CHAMBER: BUSH V. GORE, IMPEACHMENT AND BEYOND (2001). 
Margaret Heffernan argues that the issue of climate change is beset by this problem, that we 
are willfully blind because the conflict between the comfort we derive from cheap fossil-fueled 
energy and the fact that global warming produces more cognitive dissonance than we can 
handle. So we seek out news sources that remove that dissonance. See MARGARET 
HEFFERNAN, WILLFUL BLINDNESS: WHY WE IGNORE THE OBVIOUS AT OUR PERIL (2011). 
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pressing forward in other policymaking arenas. As noted above, in 
the absence of congressional action states have begun to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions and establish RPS within their borders.242 
Even if Congress is not yet ready to mandate energy-efficient new 
building codes, states have begun adopting model building efficiency 
codes that will significantly reduce energy consumption within 
buildings.243 Private litigants have begun using theories of tort 
liability to sue emitters of greenhouse gases, although those efforts 
suffered a recent setback when the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed 
nuisance actions brought against greenhouse gas emitters by the 
state of Connecticut.244 As I have noted, the Obama EPA has begun 
to regulate carbon dioxide as an air pollutant under the Clean Air 
Act.245 This is to say nothing of the myriad private and voluntary 
efforts aimed at a cleaner, more secure, more efficient, and more 
reliable energy future.246 Indeed, some analysts believe that 
individual private action may eventually do far more to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions than the regulation of larger sources ever 
will. According to Michael Vandebergh and Anne Steinmann, 
behaviors over which individuals have direct, substantial control 
account for about 4.1 trillion pounds of emissions of CO2 equivalent 
per year. This comprises almost a third of total emissions and 
represents more than the entire emissions of the United States 
 
 242. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
 243. See U.S. Dep’t. of Energy, Status of State Energy Codes,  BUILDING ENERGY CODES 
PROGRAM, http://www.energycodes.gov/states/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2011) (providing maps 
and current status for commercial and residential building energy codes operable at state 
levels). 
 244. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (affirming a 
trial court’s dismissal of public nuisance claims brought by state governments against coal-fired 
power plant owners seeking to enjoin the emission of greenhouse gases from those facilities). 
The Second Circuit had held that the district court erred in dismissing global warming claims 
premised on the federal common law of nuisance as nonjusticiable. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. 
Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011); see also Comer v. 
Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 885 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding plaintiffs had standing to proceed 
with claims for damages caused by global warming based on state common law claims of 
nuisance, trespass, and negligence). 
 245. See supra note 35. Indeed, the EPA has already imposed greenhouse gas emissions 
in some Clean Air Act Permits. See San Francisco Area Regulators Include Greenhouse Gas Caps 
in Power Plant Permit, 41 ENV’T REP. 288 (2010).  
 246. These are too numerous to list. They include voluntary action on the part of 
companies to reduce their environmental (including carbon) footprints and use energy more 
efficiently, and private sector pressure groups who try to induce companies and their products 
to become greener, etc. 
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industrial sector.247 If political entrepreneurs can activate norms of 
conservation and efficiency in individual actors, it might prove as 
effective a tool of reform as any mandate. Furthermore, even if the 
prospects are bleak for fundamental energy policy reform in the near 
term, the mere fact that public support is currently insufficient to 
produce a republican moment in Congress does not mean that this 
will always be the case. Not only will all of these state, local, and 
private efforts continue to bring real (albeit incremental) progress on 
issues at the core of energy policy reform, they are also controversial 
and are provoking reactions from opponents of reform. As a result, 
the issues at the core of reform will remain a part of the public 
debate.  
Furthermore, if that interim progress remains insufficient, 
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will continue 
to increase and the United States will remain dependent on foreign 
sources of energy. Presumably, this means that mankind will 
experience more and more of the adverse effects of this state of 
affairs, further increasing the salience of these issues in the minds of 
American voters. Indeed, this process ought to produce more of the 
kinds of catalyzing events that activate voters to mobilize in favor of 
reform: the modern equivalents of the Cuyahoga River fire or Santa 
Barbara oil spill. Likewise, Americans will continue to experience the 
costs associated with dependence upon oil imports and world 
markets for oil—markets that may once again be disrupted for 
geopolitical reasons. We can expect growing pressure on the United 
States from our allies (particularly among the world’s industrialized 
democracies) to take stronger action to develop cleaner, more 
efficient energy sources.248 That international pressure, in turn, might 
stimulate real movement toward cooperative solutions that include 
developing countries like India and China. A worsening situation 
might create an environment in which both the developed and the 
developing countries are more willing to bargain and sacrifice in 
order to develop a cooperative solution to climate change and other 
pressing energy issues.  
The American policymaking process was not built for speed; to 
the contrary, it was built to resist demands for change from 
 
 247. Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 96, at 1693–94. 
 248. American public opinion already lags behind that of most industrialized democracies 
on this issue.  
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temporary “factions” and to respond instead only to the permanent 
interests of the larger community. So far, at least, Congress does not 
yet recognize the need for a costly transition to cleaner energy, 
energy independence, or greater efficiency and reliability as among 
the public’s permanent interests.249 Relying upon a worsening 
situation to generate the political will to act is not a happy prospect. 
However, if the experts are correct that the costs of inaction exceed 
the costs of action, we can expect the march of time to help voters 
come to understand the costs of inaction; in that event, we can 
expect increasing percentages of voters to support fundamental 

























 249. Of course, the statement implies that the legislative process does not respond to 
factions and does respond to permanent interests, which certainly is arguable. Perhaps a more 
precise way to put it would be to say that public support for fundamental energy policy reform 
has not yet grown sufficiently strong to overcome the impediments the Framers built into the 
American legislative process, irrespective of whether those impediments serve the purposes the 
Framers intended. 
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